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1 Introduction
Population and economic activities are astoundingly localized in space. For any spatial
resolution—within countries, regions, or cities—disproportional concentrations of popu-
lation, firms, or shops are present. For instance, just five cities (MSAs) of the United States,
which make up about 5% of its cultivated land area, produces over 20% of the country’s
nominal GDP (as of 2017). The three major prefectures in Japan account for over 30% of
the nominal GDP and 20% of the total population of the country, while taking up less than
5% of the total inhabitable area in the country (as of 2015).
Over the past four decades, the field of spatial economics has developed numerous
theoretical and quantitative models to account for the uneven distribution of economic
activities across cities and regions. The rich vein of theoretical modeling for endogenous
agglomeration ( e.g., Fujita et al., 1999a; Baldwin et al., 2003;Duranton andPuga, 2004; Fujita
and Thisse, 2013) has been an important source of intuition-building devices in economics.
In simplified geographical environments such as two-regionmodels, the peaks and troughs
in the space economy are explained as the endogenous outcomes of the various trade-
offs between positive and negative incentives for spatial concentration. The accumulated
knowledge for the general equilibrium modeling of spatial phenomena, together with the
increased availability of fine spatial economic data, has allowed economists to construct
quantitative models in a progressively detailed manner (see, e.g., Redding and Rossi-
Hansberg, 2017 and Proost and Thisse, 2019, Section 5.2, for surveys). The exponential
increase in the number of quantitative studies motivates us to ask the following question:
is there any general and systematic means to classify and interpret the various spatial
economic models that are proposed in different contexts?
This paper thus introduces a general classification that sets the basis for a unified taxon-
omy of theoretical or structural spatial economic models, irrespective of their micro-level
assumptions. Our theory considers endogenous agglomeration based on ex-ante unifor-
mity, in the spirit of Krugman (1991b). We study an important family of economic geogra-
phy models that encompasses a wide range of extant models and covers all models—to the
best of our knowledge—with a continuumof homogeneous agentswith constant-elasticity-
of-substitution preferences and a single type of iceberg interregional transportation costs
(e.g., Krugman, 1991b; Helpman, 1998; Allen and Arkolakis, 2014).1 To derive insights
independent of the detailed microfoundations of the models, we fix a stylized geography
as testbed. We assume a many-region racetrack economy, as in Krugman (1993), in which
regions with the same local characteristics are symmetrically located over a circle (Fig-
ure 4). This simple geography serves as a dedicated prism through which the endogenous
interactions in themodel are decomposed according to their dependence on the underlying
1See Definition 1 for the family of models we cover.
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Spatial unit
Population density
(a) Many cities
Spatial unit
Population density
(b) A single megacity
Figure 1: “Many-cities” and “single-megacity” patterns
Global
Absent Present
Local
Absent – Class I
Present Class II Class III
Table 1: Spatial scale(s) of dispersion force(s) and model classes
proximity structure between locations. We will show in Sections 5 and 6 that our results
offer empirical implications, including regression approaches and structural modeling.
Our main result (i.e., Proposition 1) characterizes the spatial patterns of endogenous
agglomeration that can emerge from ex-ante symmetry (i.e., the uniform distribution) in
our many-region circular economy. In essence, it shows that the predictions of a model
on the overall spatial pattern is governed by the spatial scale of the endogenous negative
externalities (or dispersion force) in the model, but not on the model’s microfoundations.
The spatial scale of the dispersion force is local when the force arises from the congestion
effects inside each region (e.g., urban costs due to higher land rent in cities) and it is global
when the force depends on the proximity to other regions due to, for example, competition
between locations (e.g., interregional trade induces competition between firms in different
regions that are geographically close).2 If the dispersion force in a model is global, a
“many-cities” pattern emerges from symmetry (Figure 1a). If it is local instead, a “single-
megacity” pattern emerges (Figure 1b).3 If a model includes both dispersion force types,
then both possibilities arise, depending on the transportation cost level.
The dichotomy between local and global dispersion forces allows us to infer the basic
implications of the model and propose a simple taxonomy of economic geography models
based on three prototypical classes as follows. A model is in Class I (II) if it has only a
global (local) dispersion force and Class III if it has both (Table 1).4
Our numerical simulations supplement the theoretical predictions based on local stabil-
2See Definition 4 for formal definitions of local and global dispersion forces.
3This contrast in the “number” of cities is intrinsic and robustly generalizes to various geographical
assumptions beyond our stylized circular economy. See Appendix D for a discussion.
4Definition 5 formally defines the Class I, II, and III models.
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ity analysis in the vicinity of a uniform distribution. The difference between model classes
appears in their responses to interregional transportation costs. For Class I models, many
small cities endogenously emerge when the transportation cost is high (cf. Figure 1a). A
decrease in the transportation cost induces a decrease in the number of cities, an increase
in the spacing between them, and an increase in the size of each city. By contrast, in Class
II models, when the transportation cost is high, there is a single dispersed city (cf. Figure 1b).
When the transportation cost decreases, it causes “suburbanization” by reducing the peak
population density of the city. Class III, which is the most general, is a synthesis of Classes
I and II. That is, when the transportation cost is high, a Class III model behaves as a Class
I model and many small cities emerge. When the transportation cost is low, a single dis-
persed city exists, similar to a Class II model. At moderate levels of transportation cost,
multiple dispersed city are generated (see Figure 13b). A decrease in transportation costs
simultaneously causes a decrease in the number of cities (as in Class I models) and the
flattening of each city (as in Class II models).
Notably, this behavior of Class IIImodels provides a consistent interpretation of the evo-
lution of the population distribution in Japan during 1970–2015. This period witnessed an
almost from-scratch improvement in interregional accessibility in Japan, since the develop-
ment of highways and high-speed railway networks was triggered by the Tokyo Olympics
of 1964. Numerically, the total highway (high-speed railway) length increased from 879 km
(515 km) to 14,146 km (5,350 km), which is more than a 16 (10) times increase. Suppose that
a “city” is defined by the set of contiguous 1 km × 1 km cells with a population density of
at least 1,000/km2 and a total population of at least 10,000.5 As such, 302 cities survived
throughout the 45-year period, experiencing an average 21% increase in population size
(controlling for national population growth). That is, there was a selective concentration
towards a subset of cities, analogous to the implications of Class I and III models. The pro-
cess was also associatedwith a flattening at the local scale: there was a 94% increase in area
size and a 22% decrease in population density for an average individual city, analogous to
the predictions of Class II and III models.
We also offer an additional result (Proposition 2) that reveals the effects of exogenous
regional advantages (e.g., differences in amenities or productivity), which play a key role
in counterfactual analyses based on calibrated quantitative economic geography models
(see Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017). Naturally, for a given transportation cost level,
an exogenously advantageous region attracts more population than the average. We show
that, when interregional access improves from the transportation cost level, the role of
exogenous regional advantages is strengthened and weakened in Class I and II models,
respectively. If exogenous heterogeneity causes one region to attract more population,
then such asymmetry will be magnified and reduced in Class I and II models, respectively.
5See Appendix B for details.
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This again indicates that the spatial scale of the dispersion force in a given model crucially
governs the comparative static results of the model over other details.
In sum, our theoretical results reduce numerous economic geography models to a
few model classes, according to the spatial scale of their dispersion forces. Therefore,
our approach is philosophically related to those of Arkolakis et al. (2012) or Allen et
al. (2019), who formulate general model classes that encompass a wide range of trade
models in the literature as special cases, focusing on their macro-level restrictions rather
than on their micro-level assumptions. Our approach is complementary to theirs, in that
we focus on economic geography models that feature the multiplicity of equilibria and
endogenous agglomeration. Recent evidence suggests that the multiplicity of equilibria
and path dependence matter in the space economy in the long run (Bleakley and Lin, 2012;
Michaels and Rauch, 2018). Consequently, the models that feature endogenous regional
asymmetry can be useful for long-term counterfactual analyses. However, a well-known
drawback of such models is that they may exhibit complex behaviors and cause technical
and computational difficulties. In this regard, additional knowledge on the relationship
between the spatial scale of dispersion forces and the resulting spatial patterns may be
useful. For instance, our classification can be employed for choosingmodels to quantify the
presence of the possiblemultiplicity of equilibria. Class III is themost general andmay thus
replicate the reality best among the three classes, as in the context of Japan discussed above.
Class I would suffice if we are interested in the global patterns of economic agglomeration
such as the number and population size of cities. If a major city region with a monopolar
structure is the scope of the analysis, then Class II may be a reasonable choice.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a general class
of economic geography models, which we call canonical models. The simplest geographical
setup, a two-region economy, is explored as a primer for our approach. The formal def-
initions of spatial scale of dispersion forces are also introduced in this section. Section 3
presents the main result, that is, Proposition 1. Section 4 illustrates the key implications of
the main result with a minimal example. Section 5 provides a more extensive numerical
examples and discusses the relationship with the empirical literature. Section 6 consid-
ers the effects of asymmetries in regional characteristics, leading to the additional result
(Proposition 2). Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Basic framework
We introduce a generic format for the many-region economic geography models and ex-
plore three specific models in the literature in a classical two-region setup. Definition 1
introduces the canonical models, the fundamental model class we focus on. Definition 4
introduces the spatial scale of a dispersion force, which is the main concept used in this
5
paper.
2.1 A general format
We adhere to the simplest form of economic geography models, that is, static models with
a single type of mobile agents. Consider an economy comprised of N regions, where a
region is the discrete spatial unit. Let N ≡ {1, 2, . . . , N} be the set of regions. There exists
a unit-mass continuum of mobile agents. Each agent chooses a region to locate in. Let
xi ≥ 0 be the mass of agents in region i, whereby x ≡ (xi)i∈N is the spatial distribution of
agents. The set of all possible spatial distributions is X ≡ {x ≥ 0 | ∑i∈N xi = 1}. For each
x ∈ X , a payoff function vi(x) gives the payoff for the agents in region i. We assume that
v(x) ≡ (vi(x))i∈N is one-time differentiable if xi > 0 for all i ∈ N .
Agents can freely relocate across N regions to improve their payoffs. Then, x ∈ X is a
spatial equilibrium if the following Nash equilibrium condition is met:{
v∗ = vi(x) for all regions i ∈ N with xi > 0,
v∗ ≥ vi(x) for any region i ∈ N with xi = 0,
(1)
where v∗ is the associated equilibrium payoff level.
An indispensable feature of an economic geography model is the presence of spatial
frictions, or distance-decay effects, for the shipment of goods or for communication among
agents. That is, v depends on a proximity matrixD = [φij] that summarizes the interregional
transportation costs. Each entry φij ∈ (0, 1] is the freeness of interactions between regions
i and j. Such a structure of v is ubiquitous when we assume “iceberg” spatial frictions.
Payoff function v can include positive and negative externalities of spatial concentra-
tion, which may depend on interregional transportation costs. Owing to the positive
externalities, economic geography models often face multiple spatial equilibria. As such,
it is customary to introduce equilibrium refinement based on local stability under myopic
dynamics. We follow this strategy. All the formal claims on the stability of equilibria in this
paper hold true for the various standard dynamics employed in the literature. Remark C.4
in Appendix C provides concrete examples of the dynamics we cover.
Formal results in the remainder of this section are the corollaries of Proposition 1 to be
provided in Section 3. See the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A.
2.2 A first view of endogenous agglomeration
The stability of a spatial equilibrium is parameter dependent. Particularly, changes in
transportation costs can trigger a spontaneous emergence of regional asymmetry due to
the instability of spatial uniformity (Papageorgiou and Smith, 1983).
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For illustration purposes, we start with a classical two-region setup (N = 2). There are
two regions that have identical characteristics, that is, there are no exogenous advantages.
The proximity matrix for this setup is expressed as:
D =
[
1 φ
φ 1
]
, (2)
where φ ∈ (0, 1) is the freeness of the interaction between the two regions. The interpreta-
tion of φ depends on context.
The uniform distribution of agents, x¯ ≡ (x¯, x¯) with x¯ = 12 , is always a spatial equilib-
rium. How such a symmetric spatial distribution becomes unstable and an endogenous
regional asymmetry of the form x = (x′, x′′) with x′ > x′′ is generated?
There is a general model-independent characterization: x¯ is stable (unstable) if the
payoff gain of an agent relocating from one region to the other is negative (positive). The
gain for a deviant can be evaluated by the following elasticity of the payoff difference:
ω =
x¯
v¯
∂(v1(x¯)− v2(x¯))
∂x1
=
x¯
v¯
(
∂v1(x¯)
∂x1
− ∂v2(x¯)
∂x1
)
, (3)
where v¯ is the uniform payoff level at x¯, so that v(x¯) = (v¯, v¯).
If ω < 0, then x¯ is stable because there are no incentives for agents to migrate; ω < 0
indicates that a marginal increase in the mass of agents in a region induces a relative
decrease in the payoff therein. The instability of x¯ for ω > 0 follows the same logic: if
a small fraction of agents relocate from region 2 to 1, this induces a relative increase of
the payoff in region 1, encouraging further migration from region 2. If we start from a
state where x¯ is stable (ω < 0), the endogenous regional asymmetry emerges when gains
become positive (ω > 0). The monotonic changes of freeness of interregional access φ can
trigger such qualitative transitions, as demonstrated by Krugman (1991b).
Let V ≡ x¯v¯∇v(x¯) be the matrix of the payoff elasticity, evaluated at x¯, where ∇v(x¯) =
[ ∂vi∂xj (x¯)] is the corresponding Jacobian matrix of v(x). Then, ω is an eigenvalue of V with
eigenvector z ≡ (1,−1), because (3) implies that ωz = Vz, which is the definition of an
eigenvalue–eigenvector pair.6 Since z represents a population increase in one region and a
decrease in the other, it is the migration pattern in the two-region economy. Obviously, z is
model independent.
The concrete form of ω is model dependent. We focus on a specific family of models,
which we call canonical models. Canonical models encompass a wide range of extant
6Thatωz = Vz follows because the indices of the regions are interchangeable. AsV is a 2× 2 matrix, there
exists another eigenvector, namely 1 = (1, 1). The only relevant eigenvector is z, because 1 corresponds to
population increases in both regions, obviously violating the assumption that the total mass of mobile agents
is fixed.
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economic geography models. In particular, they include models that assume (i) a single
type of homogeneous mobile agents with constant-elasticity-of-substitution preferences
and (ii) a single sector that is subject to iceberg interregional transportation costs.7
Definition 1 (Canonical models). Consider economic geography model v with proximity
matrixD = [φij]. Let D¯ be the row-normalized version ofD, whose (i, j)th element is given
by φij∑k∈N φik . Let V =
x¯
v¯∇v(x¯) be the payoff elasticity matrix at x¯. The model is canonical if
there exists a rational function G that is continuous over [0, 1] and satisfies
V = G(D¯). (4)
We call G the gain function of the model.
In Definition 1, for a rational function (i.e., the ratio of two polynomials) of form
G(t) = G
](t)
G[(t)
with polynomials G](t) and G[(t) 6= 0, we define G(D¯) = G[(D¯)−1G](D¯),
where, for a polynomial G](t) = c0 + c1t+ c2t2 + · · · , we let
G](D¯) = c0I+ c1D¯+ c2D¯2 + · · · , (5)
with I being the identity matrix.8
For a wide range of general equilibrium economic geography models that incorporate
gravity-form interregional trade, there are two matrix polynomials, G](D¯) and G[(D¯)
that satisfy V = G[(D¯)−1G](D¯); thereby, there is a rational function G that satisfies the
hypotheses in Definition 1. We will see two examples in Section 2.3.9 Definition 1 covers,
for example, models of endogenous city center formation (e.g., Beckmann, 1976), single-
industrymonopolistically competitive economic geographymodels (e.g., Krugman, 1991b;
Helpman, 1998), and economic geography variants of the “universal gravity” framework
(Allen et al., 2019), which in turn encompasses perfectly competitive Armington models
with labor mobility (Allen and Arkolakis, 2014). Section 3 provides more examples.10
When we have V = G(D¯) with a rational function G, it is standard in matrix analysis
7As noted by Allen et al. (2019); Arkolakis et al. (2012), this class of models includes various important
models in the literature. However, we should also note that the iceberg cost is not an innocuous assumption
for modeling a spatial economy (see, e.g., Hummels and Skiba, 2004; Irarrazabal et al., 2015; Proost and
Thisse, 2019, Section 3.5.2), although it is widely employed in the literature for tractability.
8The assumption that G is rational is not restrictive because any continuous function defined on a closed
interval can be approximated as closely as desired by a polynomial (theWeierstrass approximation theorem).
9See also Appendix F.1 in Appendix F for a general derivation.
10See Remark C.1 in Appendix C for examples of extant models we do not cover. Canonical models do not
include models based on Ottaviano et al. (2002) which assume quadratic preference and urban models with
multiple types of mobile agents such as in Fujita and Ogawa (1982); Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002). For
the Ottaviano et al. (2002) framework with a single type of mobile agents, the results are similar to canonical
models (see Remark C.1).
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that ω, the eigenvalue of Vwith eigenvector z = (1,−1), is given by
ω = G(χ) and χ = 1− φ
1+ φ
, (6)
where χ is the eigenvalue of D¯ = 11+φD associatedwith z = (1,−1).11 Wesee that χ ∈ (0, 1)
is a monotonically decreasing continuous function of φ ∈ (0, 1). If φ is small (large), χ is
large (small). Since G is continuous, ω = G(χ(φ)) smoothly varies with φ.
Gain function G of a model summarizes the endogenous effects under the model. For
example, consider the seminal model of Beckmann (1976) on the formation of an urban
center within a city.12
Example 2.1 (The Beckmannmodel). Numerous variants of the model have been proposed
since the original formulation of Beckmann (e.g., Mossay and Picard, 2011; Blanchet et al.,
2016). Consider the following multiplicative specification:
vi(x) = x
−γ
i Ei(x), (7)
where γ > 0. The first component, x−γi , reflects negative externalities due to congestion
and the second, Ei(x), represents positive externalities arising from agents’ preference for
proximity to others. A typical specification for Ei(x) is
Ei(x) = ∑
j∈N
e−τ`ijxj, (8)
where τ > 0 is the distance-decay parameter and `ij > 0 is the distance between i and j.
The proximity matrix is expressed as D = [e−τ`ij ]. If N = 2, φ = e−τ`12 = e−τ`21 ∈ (0, 1)
represents the level of externalities that spill over from one location to the other.
We have V = −γI+ D¯ and ω = −γ+ χ. The model is therefore a canonical model
with gain function G(χ) = −γ+ χ. Negative term −γ in G(χ) corresponds to the con-
gestion effect through x−γi and positive term χ corresponds to positive externalities Ei(x).
The former is the loss from congestion, whereas the latter represents the gains from the
additional proximity to be induced by migration. Thus, ω is the net gain from migration.
When φ is close to 1, so that the relative location in the economy becomes irrelevant, χ
disappears, leaving only congestion effect −γ.
If γ < 1, then x¯ is stable for φ ∈ (φ∗, 1) and unstable for φ ∈ (0, φ∗), where φ∗ ≡ 1−γ1+γ .
There is some endogenous asymmetry when φ ∈ (0, φ∗). If γ ≥ 1, then x¯ is stable for all
φ ∈ (0, 1). That is, strong congestion effects suppress endogenous agglomeration. 
Asper the example, apositive (negative) term inω = G(χ) represents the agglomeration
11See Fact E.1 in Appendix E.
12In this respect, a “region” would best considered an “urban zone” in the model.
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(dispersion) force. Therefore, ω is the net agglomeration force. We introduce the following
formal definitions.
Definition 2. A dispersion (agglomeration) force in a canonical model is a negative (positive)
term in its gain function G.
2.3 The reversed scenarios of Krugman and Helpman
Other examples of canonical models are the general equilibrium models of Krugman
(1991b) and Helpman (1998). In the two-region case, proximity matrix D is given by (2),
where φ ≡ τ1−σ is the freeness of trade defined with τ > 1, the “iceberg” transportation
cost parameter between the two regions, and σ > 1, the elasticity of substitution between
horizontally differentiated varieties.
On the φ-axis, themodels are known to exhibit a sharp contrast regardingwhen endoge-
nous regional asymmetry emerges, that is, the “Krugman’s scenario is reversed” (Fujita
and Thisse, 2013, Chapter 8) in the Helpman model. In the Krugman (Helpman) model,
uniform distribution x¯ is stable when φ is low (high) and asymmetry exists when φ is high
(low). The model predictions are thus “opposites” of each other.
We provide below brief definitions of the many-region extensions for the models.13
Example 2.2 (The Krugman model). The payoff function (the indirect utility of mobile
workers) for the Krugman model is given by
vi(x) = wi(x)Pi(x)−µ, (9)
where wi(x) is the nominal wage of mobile workers for a given spatial distribution of
mobile workers x and Pi(x) is the Dixit–Stiglitz price index in region i:
Pi(x) ≡
(
∑
j∈N
xj
(
wj(x)τji
)1−σ) 11−σ , (10)
where µ ∈ (0, 1) is the expenditure share of manufactured goods and τij ≥ 1 the iceberg
transportation cost parameter. That is, τij units should be shipped from origin i for one
unit to arrive at destination j. Nominal wagew(x) = (wi(x))i∈N is the unique solution for
a system of nonlinear equations that summarizes the market equilibrium conditions under
a fixed x (i.e., the gravity flows of interregional trade, goods and labor market clearing, and
13See Appendix F for details.
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the zero-profit condition of firms):
wixi = ∑
j∈N
xi
(
wiτij
)1−σ
∑k∈N xk
(
wkτkj
)1−σ ej ∀i ∈ N , (11)
where ei ≡ µ (wixi + li) is region i’s expenditure on differentiated goods and li > 0 the
region-fixed immobile demand. The proximity matrix for the model is D = [φij] =
[τ1−σij ]. 
Example 2.3 (The Helpman model). Using the same notation as in the Krugman model,
the payoff function of mobile agents in the Helpman model is given by:
vi(x) =
(
xi
ai
)−γ
(wi(x) + r¯)
µ Pi(x)−µ, (12)
where ai is the endowment of housing stock in region i, γ ≡ 1− µ ∈ (0, 1) the expenditure
share of housing goods, and r¯ an equal dividend from the total rental revenue fromhousing
in the economy. The market equilibrium conditions under a given x are summarized by
(11) where ei = µ(wi + r¯)xi, with w(x) being the unique solution. The proximity matrix
for the model is the same as in the Krugman model. 
We now confirm the “reversed scenario” using our notation. Both the Krugman and
Helpman models are canonical models. Appendix F shows that V = x¯v¯∇v(x¯) is given by
V = G[(D¯)−1G](D¯), (13)
where G[(χ) ≡ 1− µσχ− σ−1σ χ2 and
G](χ) = c1χ − c2χ2 (the Krugman model), (14)
G](χ) = − γ + c1χ − (c2 − γ)χ2 (the Helpman model), (15)
with c1 ≡ µ
(
1
σ−1 +
1
σ
)
and c2 ≡ µ
2
σ−1 +
1
σ . The gain functions for the models are given by:
ω = G(χ) =
G](χ)
G[(χ)
, (16)
where χ = 1−φ1+φ with φ = τ
1−σ, as in (6).14 Figure 2 shows G](χ) for the Krugman and
Helpman models, which are both quadratic.15
14Fujita et al. (1999a) calls χ “a sort of index of trade cost” (page 57), whereas Baldwin et al. (2003) calls it
“a convenient measure of closed-ness” (page 46).
15Appendix F shows that, for many extant models, V is represented by up to the second-order term of the
proximity matrix.
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0
χ∗
1 χ
G](χ)
(a) The Krugman model
0 χ∗ 1
χ
G](χ)
(b) The Helpman model
Figure 2: G](χ) for the Krugman and Helpman models
0
G♯(1)
ϕ∗ 1 ϕ
(a) The Krugman model
0
G♯(1)
−γ
ϕ∗ 1 ϕ
(b) The Helpman model
Figure 3: ω] ≡ G](χ(φ)) for the Krugman and Helpman models
The stability of x¯ is dictated by the sign of numerator G](χ) since G[(χ) > 0. That is,
x¯ is stable if G](χ) < 0. In other words, G] summarizes the net relative magnitudes of the
agglomeration and dispersion forces in each model.
The “reversed scenario” can be graphically verified using Figure 3. Composite function
ω] ≡ G](χ(φ)) for each model is depicted in the figure. For each (14) and (15), there exists
(at most) one root φ∗ for G](χ(φ∗)) = 0 in (0, 1).16 We see
x¯ is stable when
φ ∈ (0, φ∗) (the Krugman model),φ ∈ (φ∗, 1) (the Helpman model).
As expected, x¯ is stable for low (high) values of φ in the Krugman (Helpman) model and
unstable otherwise. From (6), threshold φ∗ is given by φ∗ ≡ 1−χ∗1+χ∗ , where χ∗ is the solution
for G](χ) = 0 (see Figure 2).
2.4 Spatial scale of dispersion forces
According to Definition 2, the agglomeration force in the Krugman model is captured by
the first term in (14) and the dispersion force by the second term. In the Helpman model,
16If no such φ∗ exists, there is no switch in the stability of x¯ for φ ∈ (0, 1). If ω] = G](χ(φ)) > 0 for all
φ ∈ (0, 1), x¯ is unstable for all φ, whereas ω] < 0 for all φ ∈ (0, 1) implies the contrary. We preclude these
cases to focus on endogenous agglomeration due to the changes in φ.
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the second term in (15) reflects the agglomeration force, whereas the first and third terms
reflect the dispersion forces.17
The two models have equivalent agglomeration forces. The common agglomeration
force, c1χ in G](χ), arises from the price index of the differentiated varieties (10). Since a
region with a larger set of suppliers in the market has a lower price index, mobile workers
prefer such a region if the nominal wage is the same. This force is stronger when φ is low
and declines as φ increases.
By elimination, the “reversed scenario” must stem from differences in the dispersion forces.
The dispersion force in the Krugman model is the so-called market-crowding effect between
firms (see Baldwin et al., 2003, Chapter 2). If a firm is geographically close to others, the
firm can only pay a low nominal wage because of competition. Therefore, mobile workers
are discouraged to enter a region in which firms face fierce market competition with other
firms in that location as well as nearby regions thereof. The dispersion force thus depends
on proximity structure D and appears as a negative second-order term, −c2χ2. This force
is stronger when χ is large, that is, when φ is small.
The main dispersion force in the Helpman model, on the other hand, represents a local
congestion effect. The force stems from competition in the housing market of each region.18
The local housing market does not depend on interregional trade cost structureD but only
on the mass of agents within each region. The dispersion force thus appears in G](χ) as
negative constant term−γ. Since the agglomeration force (c1χ) declines as φ increases, the
relative strength of the dispersion force rises with trade freeness φ.
The comparison between the Krugman and Helpman models highlights that the key
difference is whether the dispersion force depends on the interregional transportation cost
structure, D. To denote this distinction, we introduce the formal notion of spatial scale of
dispersion forces.
Wefirstdefinenet gain functions to simplify thedefinitionof the spatial scale ofdispersion
forces. In essence, we ignore the denominator ofG,G[, which is positive and thus irrelevant
for the stability of x¯.
Definition 3. A net gain function G] for a canonical model with gain function G is a poly-
nomial that satisfies sgn[ω] = sgn[G(χ)] = sgn[G](χ)] for all χ ∈ (0, 1).
The net gain functions for the Krugman and Helpman models are, respectively, given
by (14) and (15) because G[(χ) > 0 for all χ ∈ (0, 1). For the Beckmann model, we see
G](χ) = G(χ) = −γ+ χ.
17The Helpman model exhibits endogenous asymmetry if µ > σ−1σ . This condition implies that c2 − γ > 0
and, thus, the last term in (15) is negative.
18The market-crowding effect also exists in the Helpman model: −(c2 − γ)χ2 in G](χ). However, in
contrast to the Krugman model, it does not have a stabilizing power when φ is small, due to the absence of
immobile factors in production. Technically, G](χ(0)) > 0 and x¯ is unstable when φ is small.
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Figure 4: N-region racetrack economy.
We can introduce the spatial scale of dispersion forces, which refines the definition of
dispersion forces (Definition 2).
Definition 4 (Spatial scale of dispersion forces). A negative constant term in net gain
function G](χ) is called a local dispersion force. A negative non-constant term in G](χ) is
called a global dispersion force.
The main dispersion force in the Krugman (Helpman) model is global (local). A global
dispersion force is triggered when φ is low and a local dispersion force when φ is high due
to an increase in its relative importance. The “reversed scenario” of Krugman model and
Helpman model stems from the differences in the spatial scales of their dispersion forces.
3 Classification of canonical models
We show that there is a major watershed between “Krugman-like” and “Helpman-like”
models in terms of endogenous spatial patterns in many-region economy, and that the
spatial scale of the dispersion force plays the key role. By considering a racetrack economy
à la Krugman (1993), this section presents the main result, Proposition 1. It provides
a categorization of endogenous spatial distributions that can emerge from the spatially
uniform distribution in canonical models.
Consider an N-region economy in which regions are symmetrically placed over a cir-
cumference and interactions are possible only through the circular network (Figure 4).
Assumption RE. Proximity matrix D = [φij] is given by φij = φ`ij , where φ ∈ (0, 1) is the
freeness of transportation between two consecutive regions and `ij ≡ min{|i− j|, N − |i−
j|} is the shortest-path distance over the circumference. N is a multiple of four.19
In line with Sections 2, we assume that payoff function v does not introduce any ex-ante
asymmetries across regions. Technically, this can be formalized as:20
Assumption S. For all x ∈ X , payoff function v satisfies v(Px) = Pv(x) for all permutation
matrices P that satisfy PD = DP.
19N is a multiple of four only for expositional simplicity. See Appendix A.1.
20Assumption S is called equivariance. See Golubitsky and Stewart (2003) for details.
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Example 3.1. Suppose N = 4. Then, Assumption RE is that
D =

1 φ φ2 φ
1 φ φ2
1 φ
Sym. 1
 . (17)
The shape of the circular economy is invariant even if we swap the indices of regions 1 and
3. The following permutation matrix represents this re-indexing:
P =

1
1
1
1
 , (18)
andP satisfies the hypothesis of Assumption S thatPD = DP. ConditionPD = DP ensures
that the adjacency relationships between regions remain invariant under the permutation
of the indices representedbyP. The re-indexed spatial distribution is x′ = Px, where x is the
original one. If v does not include any exogenous advantages, wemust have v1(x′) = v3(x),
v2(x′) = v2(x), v3(x′) = v1(x), and v4(x′) = v4(x), that is, v(x′) = v(Px) = Pv(x) as in
Assumption S. 
Uniform pattern x¯ ≡ (x¯, x¯, . . . , x¯) (x¯ ≡ 1N ) is a spatial equilibrium under Assump-
tions RE and S. The question is what are the spatial patterns that can emerge due to the
destabilization of x¯ through purely endogenous mechanisms.
Consider an infinitesimally small migration of agents z = (zi)i∈N from x¯ so that the
new spatial distribution becomes x′ ≡ x¯+ z. We require ∑i∈I zi = 0, so that the mass of
agents does not change. Analogous to the two-region case, the marginal gain for agents
due to such a deviation can be evaluated by
ω¯ ≡ x¯
v¯
(
∑
i∈N
vi(x′)x′i − ∑
i∈N
vi(x¯)x¯
)
= z>Vz, (19)
where v¯ is the uniform level of payoff at x¯ and V = x¯v¯∇v(x¯) is the payoff elasticity matrix.
If ω¯ < 0 for any migration pattern z, then x¯ is stable.
UnderAssumptions RE and S, there is amodel-independentway to conveniently represent
all possible migration patterns:
z =∑
k
ζkzk, (20)
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Regions
xi
(a) A single megacity (x¯+ ζz1)
Regions
xi
(b) Two major cities (x¯+ ζz2)
Regions
xi
(c) Four small cities (x¯+ ζz4)
Regions
xi
(d) Eight small cities (x¯+ ζz8)
Figure 5: Schematic illustrations of migration patterns (N = 16).
Notes: We rotationally shift the spatial distribution and add the neighboring region of the leftmost
region as a light gray bar, so that it is easier to grasp the overall shapes. For expositional simplicity,
we present the cases when k is a power of 2.
where {zk} are the eigenvectors ofV and {ζk} are their coefficients. We normalize ‖zk‖2 =
z>k zk = 1 for all k. Each zk is in itself a migration pattern and is a cosine curve with k
equally spaced peaks. We thus interpret z as the weighted sum of the “basic” migration
patterns {zk}. Basic migration patterns are model-independent in the sense that they are
the eigenvectors of V irrespective of the properties of payoff function v(x).
There are essentially N2 basic migration patterns, since the concentration of agents in
every other region achieves themaximumnumber of symmetric cities.21 That is, in contrast
to the two-region economy where z = (1,−1) is the only possible migration pattern, there
are multiple possibilities in the many-region economy.
Example 3.2. Figure 5 shows spatial patterns x¯+ ζzk (k = 1, 2, 4, 8) for N = 16 with a small
ζ > 0. Basic migration patterns z1, z2, z4, and z8 express, respectively, the formation of a
single megacity (Figure 5a), two major cities (Figure 5b), four small cities (Figure 5c), and
eight small cities (Figure 5d). 
Let ωk be the eigenvalue of V associated with zk (i.e., ωkzk = Vzk). Then, (20) yields
ω¯ =∑
k
ζ2kz
>
k Vzk =∑
k
ζ2kωk. (21)
21Concretely, {zk} correspond to the real discrete Fourier modes for dimension N. They are of the form
zk ∝ (cos(θki)) where θ ≡ 2piN for k = 1, 2, . . . , N2 , and zk ∝ (sin(θ(N − k)i)) for k = N2 + 1, . . . , N. Therefore,
the number of cities (peaks) is the largest when k = N2 . See Appendix A.1.
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Thus, the migration pattern that maximizes ω¯ is the basic migration pattern that has the
largest eigenvalue:
ωmax ≡ max‖z‖2=1 ω¯ = maxk ωk, (22)
where we normalize ‖z‖2 = z>z = 1 without loss of generality.
Thus, x¯ is stable when ωmax = maxk ωk < 0. Further, x¯ becomes unstable to form
endogenous regional asymmetry whenωmax become positive. To put it differently, eachωk
is the gain from migration towards zk-direction, and x¯ becomes unstable when migration
towards some direction becomes profitable. This extends the discussion in the two-region
case based on ω to our many-region setting.
We need the concrete formulae for eigenvalues {ωk} of V. Because we consider canon-
ical models, we have V = G(D¯)where D¯ is row-normalized proximity matrix and G some
rational function. The two-region formula ω = G(χ) can then be generalized as follows:
ωk = G(χk) ∀k ∈ K, (23)
where χk is the eigenvalue of D¯ associated with zk.
Each χk is an index of the average geographical proximity among agents when the k-city
pattern x¯+ ζzk emerges. Further, χk decreases in number of cities k. This is because the
average proximity from one agent to other agents is the largest in a single-city pattern (e.g.,
Figure 5a), while it decreases as the number of peaks in the spatial distribution increases.
In particular,
max
k
{χk} = χ1 = 1− φ1+ φ and mink {χk} = χ N2 =
(
1− φ
1+ φ
)2
(24)
for any given value of φ ∈ (0, 1) (Akamatsu et al., 2012). Recall that the maximum possible
number of symmetric cities is N2 (cf. Example 3.2). Also, each χk takes value on (0, 1) and
is a monotonically decreasing function of φ, reflecting that agents are less sensitive to the
proximity to others when φ is larger (and vice versa).
Note that {zk} and {χk} are model independent. They encapsulate the properties of
the underlying geography (Assumption RE) but not those of the payoff function. The
model-dependent properties are instead represented by gain function G of a model.
That said, ωmax = maxk ωk = maxk G(χk) depends on the properties of G(χ). Section
2.3 demonstrated that the shape of gain function G of a model can crucially affect the
resulting implications, where the most important distinction is in the spatial scale of the
dispersion force in the model. We introduce a formal categorization of canonical models
based on three prototypical shapes of G.
17
Definition 5. A canonical model with gain function G is said to be:
(a) Class I, if there is at most one χ∗ ∈ (0, 1) so that G(χ) > 0 for χ ∈ (0,χ∗), G(χ∗) = 0,
and G(χ) < 0 for χ ∈ (χ∗, 1).
(b) Class II, if there is at most one χ∗∗ ∈ (0, 1) so that G(χ) < 0 for χ ∈ (0,χ∗∗),
G(χ∗∗) = 0, and G(χ) > 0 for χ ∈ (χ∗∗, 1).
(c) Class III, if there are at most two χ ∈ (0, 1) so that G(χ) = 0, denoted by χ∗∗ < χ∗,
with G(χ) < 0 for χ ∈ (0,χ∗∗) ∪ (χ∗, 1) and G(χ) > 0 for χ ∈ (χ∗∗,χ∗).
The Krugman andHelpmanmodels are, respectively, Class I and II. The first twomodel
classes in Definition 5 are, respectively, of “Krugman-type” and “Helpman-type.” Class III
features the combined characteristics of Classes I and II. We provide concrete examples of
the three model classes in the following.
Example 3.3 (Class I). Krugman (1991b), Puga (1999), Forslid andOttaviano (2003), Pflüger
(2004), and Harris and Wilson (1978). 
Example 3.4 (Class II). Helpman (1998), Murata and Thisse (2005), Redding and Sturm
(2008), Allen andArkolakis (2014), Redding andRossi-Hansberg (2017) (§3), and Beckmann
(1976). 
Example 3.5 (Class III). Tabuchi (1998), Pflüger and Südekum (2008), as well as Takayama
and Akamatsu (2011). 
As mentioned in the Introduction, Definition 5 classifies canonical models based on
the spatial scale of the working dispersion force(s) (Table 1). Net gain functions G] for all
models in the above examples are at most quadratic (see Table F.1 in Appendix F). That is,
G](χ) = c0 + c1χ+ c2χ2 (25)
with model-dependent coefficients {c0, c1, c2}, as in the Krugman or Helpman models.
When G] is quadratic and there exists an agglomeration force (a positive term), a model is
Class I if and only if there is no local dispersion force (c0 ≥ 0) but only a global dispersion
force that can stabilize x¯. Amodel is Class II if and only if there exists local dispersion force
(c0 < 0) but no working global dispersion force is present (i.e., G](1) > 0).22 A model is
Class III if and only if there exits both a local (c0 < 0) and a global dispersion force (c2 < 0),
as well as an agglomeration force (c1 > 0).
The following proposition characterizes the endogenous spatial patterns that Class I, II,
or III models engender when x¯ becomes unstable, which is essentially the characterizations
based on ωmax at the point x¯ becomes unstable.
22Consider G] for the Helpman model (15). If µ > σ−1σ , its second-order term can be negative but it cannot
stabilize x¯. If µ ≤ σ−1σ , the term can may well be positive.
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Figure 6: Examples of ω]k ≡ G](χk(φ)) (N = 16).
Proposition 1. Suppose Assumptions RE and S. Consider a canonical model of either Class I, II,
or III with gain function G. Assume G(χ) = 0 has one root (two roots) in χ ∈ (0, 1) if the model
is Class I or II (Class III), so that endogenous agglomeration occurs in φ ∈ (0, 1).
(a) If the model is of Class I, there exists φ∗ ∈ (0, 1) so that x¯ is stable for all φ ∈ (0, φ∗) and
unstable for all φ ∈ (φ∗, 1); the instability of x¯ in φ∗ leads to the formation of N2 small cities.
(b) If the model is of Class II, there exists φ∗∗ ∈ (0, 1) so that x¯ is stable for all φ ∈ (φ∗∗, 1) and
unstable for all φ ∈ (0, φ∗∗); the instability of x¯ in φ∗∗ leads to the formation of a single city.
(c) If the model is of Class III, there exist φ∗, φ∗∗ ∈ (0, 1) with φ∗ < φ∗∗ so that x¯ is stable for
all φ ∈ (0, φ∗)∪ (φ∗∗, 1); the instabilities of x¯ at φ∗ and φ∗∗ lead to the formation of N2 cities
and a single city, respectively.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Note that (a) and (b) generalizes the “reversed scenarios” of Krugman and Helpman
in that x¯ is stable for the low (high) values of φ in Class I (II) models. On the other hand,
model classes differ in the number of cities they endogenously produce. Class I models
engender N2 small cities, whereas those of Class II entail a single megacity. Class III is a
synthesis of Classes I and II.
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Proposition 1 builds on the relationships in (24). This can most clearly be seen in the
Beckmann model.
Example 3.6. TheBeckmannmodel (Example 2.1) isClass II becauseG(χ) = G](χ) = −γ+
χ satisfies Definition 5 (b). Because max{χk} = χ1, we have max{ωk} = max{−γ+ χk} =
−γ+ χ1 for all φ. Figure 6a shows ωk = ω]k ≡ G](χk(φ)) for N = 16. When all the curves
stay below the horizontal axis, x¯ is stable (the shaded area). The instability of x¯ occurs at
φ∗∗ = φ∗1 , leading to the formation of a single megacity (Figure 5a). The maximality of ω1
can be clearly interpreted. In the model, the formation of a single large city is the most
beneficial outcome for every agent because agents prefer proximity to others, albeit agents
must disperse around the city center to avoid local congestion effects. 
Representative examples of general equilibrium models from all three classes are also
shown in Figure 6.
Example 3.7. Figure 6b and Figure 6c respectively depictω]k for the Krugman andHelpman
models, as the leading examples of Classes I and II. For all φ so that x¯ is stable, max{ω]k} =
ω]N
2
in the Krugman model, whereas max{ω]k} = ω]1 in the Helpman model. When
x¯ becomes unstable, 162 = 8 cities emerge for the former model, whereas a single city
emerges for the latter. Figure 6d shows ω]k for an instance of Class III, the Pflüger and
Südekum (2008) model. Observe there are two ranges of φ under which x¯ is stable. With
both local and global dispersion forces, the model behaves as a Class I (II) model at a low
(high) φ. 
4 Illustration: Beyond the reversed scenarios
As a concrete illustration of Proposition 1, we reconsider the Krugman and Helpman
models studied in Section 2.3. In a many-region world, the “reversed scenario” of the two
models is no longer just a reversal of the binary process between symmetry and asymmetry.
The Krugman and Helpman models provide minimal examples of the difference between
Classes I and II. The difference in the spatial scale of dispersion forces induces an intrinsic
contrast not only in timing but also in endogenous spatial patterns, as shown by Proposition 1.
Suppose Assumptions RE and S and let N = 4 (see Figure 7). This is the simplest
setup in which different regions can have different neighbors. Example 3.1 provides the
proximity matrix for this case.23
Uniform distribution x¯ = (x¯, x¯, x¯, x¯) with x¯ ≡ 14 is a spatial equilibrium. As discussed,
x¯ is stable if all the eigenvalues of V = x¯v¯∇v(x¯) are negative. There are two (= N2 = 42 )
23We may assume that the proximity between two regions on the antipodal points is φ′ ∈ (0, 1) (with a
natural restriction φ′ < φ). It is inconsequential.
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Figure 7: Four-region racetrack economy.
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Figure 8: Schematic illustrations of spatial patterns
Notes: As region 1 is neighboring region 4 on the circle, we rotationally shift the spatial distributions
for better understandability.
eigenvalues of interest, which we denote by ω1 and ω2. Associated with them, there are
two “basic” migration patterns:24
z1 =
1√
2
(1, 0,−1, 0) and z2 = 12(1,−1, 1,−1). (26)
Note that z1 and z2 do not include any parameters and thus are model independent.
Figure 8 shows the schematics of the two possible outcomes from x¯. The two spatial
configurations have distinct characteristics: one represents the formation of a singlemegacity
that attracts all the population in the economy (Figure 8a), whereas the other represents
the emergence of two small cities vying with each other (Figure 8b).
The question is which of the two patterns emerge endogenously in the Krugman and
Helpman models—a single megacity or two small cities? Proposition 1 (a) and (b) re-
spectively show that the Krugman model produces two small cities and that the Helpman
model produces a single city.
To show this, we ask whether ωmax = ω1 or ωmax = ω2 when x¯ becomes unstable, as
we recall each ωk represents the net agglomerative force towards basic migration pattern
24SinceV is 4× 4, there exist two eigenvectors other than z1 and z2: one is uniformvector 1 = 12 (1, 1, 1, 1), in
keeping with N = 2, and the other is 1√
2
(0, 1, 0,−1), which has the same meaning as z1 because of rotational
symmetry. In fact, its associated eigenvalue is ω1.
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zk. In fact, by noting ωkzk = Vzk, we can show that
ω1 = G(χ1) =
x¯
v¯
(
∂v1(x¯)
∂x1
− ∂v3(x¯)
∂x1
)
, (27)
ω2 = G(χ2) =
x¯
v¯
(
∂v1(x¯)
∂x1
− ∂v2(x¯)
∂x1
+
∂v3(x¯)
∂x3
− ∂v4(x¯)
∂x3
)
. (28)
Similar to (3), (27) indicates that if ω1 > 0, agents have an incentive to form a monocentric
spatial pattern by migrating from region 3 to 1. Similarly, (28) indicates that agents may
migrate to form a two-city pattern if ω2 > 0.
Figure 9 provides the answer to the question. For eachmodel, it depictsω]1 ≡ G](χ1(φ))
and ω]2 ≡ G](χ2(φ)) on the φ-axis, where G](χ) is the same as in the two-region case for
each model in (14) and (15) (Figure 2). As sgn[ωk] = sgn[ω
]
k], x¯ is stable if the two curves
stay below the horizontal axis (the shaded areas). That is,
x¯ is stable when
φ ∈ (0, φ∗2) (the Krugman model),φ ∈ (φ∗1 , 1) (the Helpman model).
There is an analogy with the “reversed scenario” regarding when x¯ is stable.
A sharp contrast is present in the spatial patterns. It is immediate that ωmax = ω2 > ω1
at φ∗2 for the Krugman model because ω2(φ∗2) = 0 and ω1(φ∗2) < 0. Similarly, ωmax = ω1
at φ∗1 for the Helpman model. Therefore, the spatial pattern that emerges from x¯ isthe two-city pattern (Figure 8b) (the Krugman model),the single-megacity pattern (Figure 8a) (the Helpman model),
as shown by Proposition 1 (a) and (b).
The difference in the spatial scale of dispersion forces is the source of the contrast
in the engendered spatial patterns. As discussed in Section 2.4, the dispersion force in
the Helpman model is local and triggered when φ is high. Consider the process of a
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monotonic increase in trade freeness φ. When φ is at its lower extreme (φ ≈ 0), agents
concentrate in a single region because the local dispersion force is less important than the
benefits of agglomeration when interregional transportation is prohibitively costly.25 The
spatial pattern is close to a completely monopolar pattern, for example, x ≈ (0, 1, 0, 0).
As φ increases, the relative rise in the local dispersion force induces a crowding-out from
the populated region. The spatial pattern become, for example x = (x′, x, x′, x′′) with
x > x′ > x′′, which can also be regarded as a monopolar pattern. As φ increases, the
spatial pattern gradually flattens and, at threshold φ∗1 , it must connect to uniformity x¯. If
we start from x¯ and gradually decrease φ to determine the dispersion process in a reverse-
reproduced way, at φ∗1 , the spatial pattern must deviate in the direction of the “formation”
of a single megacity (Figure 8a).
By contrast, the dispersion force in the Krugman model is global and triggered when
φ is low. Recall that the dispersion force stems from firms’ competition over consumers.
When φ is low, there are few incentives for firms to concentrate on a small number of
regions because the shipment of goods incurs large transportation costs. As φ increases,
the size of the effective market area of a firm extends. For each firm, this brings more
opportunities to access a wider range of consumers but also leads to tougher competition
with other firms that are geographically close. At some point, firms are better off forming
small cities so that each has its dominant market area but is relatively remote from other
major concentrations of firms, as in the two-city pattern (Figure 8b).
To summarize, Proposition 1 is the consequence of the difference in the spatial scale
of dispersion forces. The global dispersion force represents the repulsive effects across
different locations and supports the formation of multiple cities, whereas the local dis-
persion force represents the crowding effects that induce the flattening of each city. In a
many-region economy, these forces lead to the formation of qualitatively different spatial
patterns. This is most clearly seen by comparing the Krugman and Helpmanmodels in the
N = 4 case, which are the leading instances of Classes I and II, respectively. The contrast
in spatial patterns is hidden in the two-region setup, as the only possible migration pattern
is z = (1,−1).
There are several remarks on Proposition 1. First, it builds on local analysis around
uniform distribution x¯. It may be of interest whether we can formally prove that the local
profitable deviation at the onset of instability is actually the ultimate spatial equilibrium the
agglomeration force converges towards. The technically accurate answer is: “not always.”
To draw stronger conclusions beyond Proposition 1, we have to either introduce intricate
classifications for the properties of the higher-order differentials of the payoff function v or
25Note that mobile agents prefer concentrating towards a smaller number of regions because of the ag-
glomeration force. In both models, agents should result in a “black-hole” concentration in a single region if
there is no effective dispersion force.
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focus on a specific model.26 However, Proposition 1 provides essential practical insights
into the evolution of the spatial pattern in a circular economy.27 To highlight this point,
Section 5 will present a series of numerical examples for when N = 8.
Second, Proposition 1 assumes a complete geographical symmetry. Assumptions RE and
S abstract away regional heterogeneities and geographical advantages. It is thus of interest
to what extent or in what sense the implications of Proposition 1 generalize to asymmet-
ric cases, given that the latest quantitative spatial models incorporate flexible structures
regarding interregional transportation costs and differences in local characteristics. To ad-
dress this issue, Section 6 provides formal analyses of the effects of heterogeneous local
characteristics. We also include in Appendix D discussions on other geographical setups
and provides numerical explorations for exogenous geographical advantages due to the
existence of boundaries.
Appendix C also provides a brief discussion on the effects of idiosyncratic payoff shocks
(Remark C.2) and on the forward-looking behaviors of agents (Remark C.3).
5 Evolution of spatial structure
We numerically explore an overall evolutionary path of the spatial structure for selected
models from Classes I, II, and III in the N = 8 racetrack economy.28 We will see that
Proposition 1 captures the intrinsic properties of the whole evolutionary process.
Figure 10 reports the evolutionary path of stable equilibrium patterns in the course
of increasing φ for the Krugman model, which is Class I. In Figure 10a, the black solid
(dashed) curves depict the stable (unstable) equilibrium values of xi at each φ. Figure 10b
shows the schematic illustration of the stable spatial pattern on the path. The letters in
Figure 10b correspond to those in Figure 10a.
Consider a gradual increase in φ from φ ≈ 0. Uniform distribution x¯ is initially stable
until φ reaches the so-called “break point” φ∗ where a bifurcation from x¯ occurs. At φ∗, the
spatial pattern is pushed towards the formation of 82 = 4 cities. This confirms Proposition 1
(a). The spatial pattern immediately converges towards a four-cities pattern after φ∗ is
passed. The number of populated regions halves from 8→ 4.
A further increase in φ triggers the second and third bifurcations at φ∗∗ and φ∗∗∗,
respectively. These bifurcations sequentially double the spacing between cities, each time
26Generally, this line of research converges to bifurcation theory. See Hirsch et al. (2012) and Kuznetsov
(2004) for concise introductions. Additionally, under Assumptions RE and S, equivariant bifurcation theory
allows one to draw various technical conclusions beyond Proposition 1. See Golubitsky and Stewart (2003)
for an introduction.
27See, for instance, previous studies by (Akamatsu et al., 2012; Ikeda et al., 2012; Osawa et al., 2017; Ikeda
et al., 2018).
28The formulations of the models and the parameter settings are shown in Appendix F.
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Figure 10: Class I model (Krugman, 1991a)
halving their number, 4 → 2 → 1, in a close analogy to the first bifurcation at φ∗.29 At
the higher extreme of φ, a complete monopolar pattern emerges. This behavior can be
understood as a gradual increase in the effective market area of each city due to a decline
in transportation costs. The spatial extent of each city is one regional unit at any level of φ
because there exists no local dispersion force.
In the model, cities become larger when interregional access improves. However,
such an effect is limited to the “selected” regions. The impact of an improvement in
transportation on the size of each city can be either positive (for the selected ones) or negative
(for the others). This point is already apparent in the two-region models that explicitly
incorporate agglomeration economies combined with interregional transportation costs.
The many-region setup highlights another phenomenon. As φ increases, once selected
regions can decline to form an agglomeration shadow (Arthur, 1994; Fujita and Krugman,
1995) of other regions. For example, consider the fifth region from the left in Figure 10b.
This region is selected at the transitions at φ∗ and φ∗∗, that is, the impact of an increase
in φ is positive. However, after φ∗∗∗ is encountered, it immediately loses its population.
For the region, a monotonic increase in φ implies a winning situation followed by a losing
one. The global dispersion force in Class I models is thus related to the rise and fall of
major cities. Class I models do not provide robust predictions for each city, but they do
for the overall spatial distribution of cities: the number of cities and spacing between
them monotonically decreases and increases, respectively, with the monotonic reduction
in interregional transportation costs.
Remark 5.1. The empirical evidence on regional agglomeration presented byDuranton and
29This is the “spatial period-doubling cascade” behavior discussed by (Akamatsu et al., 2012; Osawa et al.,
2017; Ikeda et al., 2018).
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Figure 11: Class II model (Allen and Arkolakis, 2014)
Turner (2012) and Faber (2014) is related to the theoretical predictions of Class I models.
The former study focused on the growth of large metropolitan areas in the United States,
while the latter analyzed the growth of peripheral counties in China. The former (latter)
study revealed a positive (negative) correlation between the magnitude of growth and
the interregional transportation infrastructure level of a given region. For Class I models,
these opposite responses may simply reflect different sides of the same coin. That is, both
results may indicate a tendency of selective concentration towards larger regions for an
improvement in interregional transportation access (as discussed in the Introduction for
Japan). 
Next, Figure 11 shows the results for a Class II model, namely, the Allen and Arkolakis
(2014). This model incorporates a local dispersion force, And, thus, x¯ is stable for higher
values of φ. As in Section 4, we see the evolutionary process in a reverse-reproduced
way, that is, in the course of a monotonic decrease in φ. The bifurcation at φ∗∗ leads to
the “emergence” of a unimodal pattern. This is the bifurcation in the model: when φ
decreases further, the spatial pattern monotonically and smoothly converges to a complete
concentration in a single region. We interpret a region that locally maximizes population
size (region i such that xi > xi−1 and xi > xi+1 where mod N for indices) as the location of
a city. Then, this model endogenously produces at most one city. Class II models would
be interpreted as expressing the evolution of the spatial extent of a single city, namely the
flattening of a big city during improvement in interregional transportation access.
Remark 5.2. Class II models have an attractive property for quantitative applications. We
can ensure the uniqueness of the spatial equilibrium regardless of the level of interregional
transportation costs by imposing a strong local dispersion force (e.g., Redding and Sturm,
2008; Allen and Arkolakis, 2014). If the equilibrium is unique, then the calibrations and
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Figure 12: Uniqueness and stability of equilibria in the Allen–Arkolakis model
counterfactual analyses have determinate implications. Example 2.1 provides a prototyp-
ical situation in which a strong congestion force suppress the possibility of endogenous
asymmetry (i.e., the γ ≥ 1 case). The uniqueness of the equilibrium implies the stability of
x¯ for all φ in a racetrack economy, that is, no endogenous asymmetry can emerge, since x¯
is always an equilibrium. Figure 12 provides our classification of possible spatial patterns
and their stabilities for the Allen–Arkolakis model in a racetrack economy. The uniqueness
condition for the Allen–Arkolakis model is β ≤ −α (i.e., Range 3 in the figure), which is a
sufficient condition for the stability of x¯. See also Figure I of Allen and Arkolakis (2014) in
comparison with Figure 12. 
Finally, we consider a Class III model. Because both local and global dispersion forces
exist, this class of models exhibits a rich and realistic interplay between the number of cities
and spacing between them (as in Class I models) and the spatial extent of each city (as in Class
II models).
Figure 13a shows the evolution of the number of cities in the course of increasing φ
under the Pflüger and Südekum (2008)’s model in the N = 8 racetrack economy. The
number of cities in a spatial distribution is defined by that of the local maxima therein.
Figure 13a exhibits the mixed characteristics of Figures 10 and 11, as expected. Uniform
distribution x¯ is stable for φ < φ∗ or φ > φ∗∗. We interpret the number of cities in x¯ as
either 8 (for a low φ) or as 1 (for a high φ) to acknowledge that x¯ at the low and high levels
of φ are distinct. When φ gradually increases from φ ≈ 0, the number of cities reduces
from 8 → 4 → 2 → 1 as in the Class I models (Figure 10), whereas it is always 1 in the
latter stage as per the Class II models (Figure 11). The initial stage is governed by a decline
in the global dispersion force, while the later stage is marked by a relative increase in the
local dispersion force.
Figure 13b illustrates the spatial patterns associated with Figure 13a. Uniform pattern
x¯ is initially stable (Pattern A) and the first bifurcation at φ∗ leads to a four-city pattern (B,
C), whereas the second bifurcation to the formation of two cities (D, E). These transitions
are in line with Figure 10 and are governed by the gradual decline in the global dispersion
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Figure 13: Class III model (Pflüger and Südekum, 2008)
force. Then, the evolutionary behavior becomes more interesting: the decline in the global
dispersion force increases the relative importance of the local one. As a result, the two cities
in Pattern E gradually increase their spatial extents (F, G) because of the local dispersion
effects. A further increase in φmeans the local dispersion force succeeds and the two cities
gradually merge (H, I) to form a megalopolis (J, K). As the relative importance of the local
dispersion force further increases, a gradual flattening of the single megalopolis occurs (L,
M), followed by complete dispersion (N) after φ∗∗ is reached.
Remark 5.3. Regarding the behavior of Class II and III models, there is ample empirical ev-
idence for the flattening of once established economic clusters (i.e., cities) as a consequence
of improved interregional access. Baum-Snow (2007) and Baum-Snow et al. (2017) presented
evidence for US metro areas during 1950–1990 and Chinese prefectures during 1990–2010,
respectively. These studies addressed the changes in the population or production size of
the central area within the larger region, both reporting a significantly negative effect of
improvements in interregional access. As discussed in these studies, the local flattening of
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cities can also be interpreted as suburbanization in response to the improved intra-urban
transportation infrastructure in classical urban economic theory (e.g., Alonso, 1964). 
6 Exogenous local characteristics
Proposition 1 builds on a complete geographical symmetry. However, exogenous asymme-
tries are inherent in real-world geography. As a relaxation of Assumption S, we study the
sensitivity of spatial patterns to regional characteristics, for example, local amenities and
productivity differences. This section shows that the spatial scale of dispersion force(s) in
a model tends to determine whether the effects of any exogenous advantages are amplified
(when transportation cost varies).30 Throughout, we assume Assumption RE.
Let a = (ai)i∈N with ai > 0 indicate some regional characteristic, which may or may
not affect the payoffs in other regions. For instance, ai may be the level of amenities in
region i exclusively enjoyed by the residents therein or the total factor productivity of the
region. In the latter case, interregional trade flows and the resulting payoff levels in other
regions can depend on ai.
The regions are symmetric if a = a¯ ≡ (a¯, a¯, . . . , a¯), for some a¯ > 0. Therefore, pair
(x¯, a¯) is an equilibrium. Consider a variation in the local characteristic so that a = a¯+ e
with small e = (ei)i∈N . Then, there is a new equilibrium, say x(a), which is close to x¯.
The “covariance” between region i’s relative (dis)advantage ei = ai − a¯ and the relative
deviation of its population xi(a)− x¯ is then evaluated by:
ρ ≡ (a− a¯)> (x(a)− x¯) = ∑
i∈N
(ai − a¯) (xi(a)− x¯) . (29)
We here assume that x¯ is stable, since otherwise considering x(a) is nonsensical.
We expect ρ > 0 if regional characteristic a acts positively in the payoff for agents, that
is, if a is in fact “advantageous.” To formalize this intuition, we focus on a formulation
class of local characteristics, a, which encompass various standard specifications in the
literature. Let A ≡ a¯v¯ [ ∂vi∂aj ] be the elasticity matrix of the payoff regarding a, evaluated at
(x¯, a¯). Analogous to our definition of canonical models in Definition 1, we suppose the
following.
Assumption A. For the local characteristic a under consideration, there exists a rational
function G\ that is continuous over (0, 1), positive whenever x¯ is stable, and satisfies
A = G\(D¯).
For each model in Examples 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5, there exists in fact a function G\ that
30Apart from the sensitivity analysis, a general fact is that small perturbations in local factors do not
qualitatively alter the predictions of Proposition 1. See Remark C.7 for a brief discussion.
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satisfies the hypotheses of Assumption A for each natural choice of a local characteristic
vector. The simplest example is that of heterogeneous local amenity, as considered by Allen
and Arkolakis (2014).
Example 6.1. Assume that the payoff function takes the form vi(x, a) = aivi(x), where
ai > 0 is the exogenous level of regional amenities and v(x) = (vi(x))i∈N represents the
symmetric (or homogeneous) component of the payoff function that satisfiesAssumption S.
Then, A = a¯v¯ v¯I = a¯I and, thus, G
\(χ) = a¯ > 0. 
Analogous to gain function G of a model, G\ encodes the effect of the marginal changes
in local characteristics a on the regional payoffs v. Particularly, conditionG\(χ) > 0 implies
ρ > 0. As an example, consider a symmetric two-region economy as in Section 2.2. Then,
we can show that
ρ = cδ(χ) where δ(χ) ≡ −G
\(χ)
G(χ)
(30)
with some c > 0 and χ = 1−φ1+φ . Recall that G(χ) < 0 if x¯ is stable. Therefore, ρ > 0 if
G\(χ) > 0 for all χ so that G(χ) < 0.
To understand formula (30), in line with ω in Section 2.2, we evaluate the payoff gain
due to exogenous advantage in region 1 by the following elasticity:
α ≡ a¯
v¯
(
∂v1(x¯, a¯)
∂a1
− ∂v2(x¯, a¯)
∂a1
)
. (31)
α is an eigenvalue of A associated with z = (1,−1). Particularly, when A = G\(D¯), we
have
α = G\(χ), (32)
in close analogy with relationship ω = G(χ). Note that α > 0 by assumption.
Suppose that x¯ = (x¯, x¯) is perturbed to x = (x¯+ ξ, x¯− ξ) due to an exogenous regional
asymmetry of the form a = (a¯+ e, a¯− e) with some scalars ζ and e. Then, v1(x) = v2(x)
must hold true for x to be an equilibrium. Thus, the pair of deviations ξ and e should cancel
out two forces, namely, gain (or loss, since we assume x¯ is stable) ω < 0 from endogenous
migration and gain α > 0 from exogenous asymmetry. That is,
ωξ + αe = G(χ)ξ + G\(χ)e = 0. (33)
Then, because ρ = eξ + (−e)(−ξ) = 2eξ by definition, formula (30) follows with c = 2e2.
The fraction δ(χ) ≡ −G\(χ)G(χ) = G
\(χ)
|G(χ)| =
α
|ω| thus compares the magnitudes of gain from
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marginal exogenous advantage and of loss from marginal endogenous migration, under
the condition that the economy stays in equilibrium.
An important question from defining ρ is: does ρ increase or decrease when φ increases?
In other words, does improved transportation access strengthen (weaken) the role of local
characteristics and what are the responses of the spatial distribution of economic activities
to an improvement in interregional access if a is fixed? These are the questions asked in
counterfactual exercises employing calibrated quantitative spatial economic models (see,
e.g., Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017).
We have a general characterization for the response of ρ when φ varies.
Proposition 2. Suppose Assumption RE. Consider a canonical model with gain function G.
Consider local characteristic a that satisfies Assumption A with some G\. Assume that x¯ is stable
and define δ(χ) = −G\(χ)G(χ) . Then, the following hold true for ρ in (29):
(a) ρ′(φ) > 0, if δ′(χ) < 0 for all χ ∈ (0, 1) such that G(χ) < 0.
(b) ρ′(φ) < 0, if δ′(χ) > 0 for all χ ∈ (0, 1) such that G(χ) < 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Thus, the impacts of improved interregional access are inherently model dependent.
An important observation is that model class matters—the response of ρ to a given model
may be inferred by the spatial scale of the dispersion force in that model.
We provide examples employing common specifications of local characteristics. Below,
all derivations are collected in Appendix F. Consider the simplest specification, that is,
heterogeneous local amenity (Example 6.1). For this case, we observe a clear contrast
between the Krugman and Helpman models, the leading instances of Classes I and II.
Example 6.2. We continue with Example 6.1, where G\(χ) = a¯ > 0. Then, sgn[δ′(χ)] =
sgn[ a¯G
′(χ)
G(χ)2 ] = sgn[G
′(χ)]. The Krugman model (Example 2.2) satisfies G′(χ) < 0 and
thus ρ′(φ) > 0. On the other hand, the Helpman model (Example 2.3) satisfies G′(χ) >
0 and thus ρ′(φ) < 0 whenever the equilibrium is unique (as assumed in quantitative
applications). 
To determine why such contrast emerges, consider a two-region setup for which
ρ(φ) = cδ(χ(φ)) from (30). Recall that δ(χ) = G
\(χ)
|G(χ)| is the relative magnitude of the gains
from an exogenous advantage against loss from migration at x¯. Assume that δ′(χ) < 0.
Then, either gain α = G\(χ) from the exogenous regional asymmetry decreases in χ = 1−φ1+φ
(i.e., increases in φ) or the magnitude of loss |ω| = |G(χ)| from the endogenous migration
increases in χ (i.e., decreases in φ). Recall that Class I models exhibit endogenous agglom-
eration due to the decline of the global dispersion force in the course of increasing φ (see
Section 2.4). In other words, in Class I models, |ω| decreases in φ (i.e., increases in χ) as
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long as x¯ is stable. Therefore, if G\(χ) is a constant, as in Example 6.2, we expect δ′(χ) < 0
in Class I models because δ is inversely proportional to |ω|. A similar discussion applies
to δ′(χ) > 0, and we expect that Class II models satisfy δ′(χ) > 0.
The contrast between Classes I and II generalizes to the regional characteristics that
affect interregional trade flows, rather than purely local factors. For such cases, G\(χ)
become non-constant.
Example 6.3. Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017), §3, considered a Class II model, namely
the Helpman model with a modified market equilibrium condition:
wixi = ∑
j∈N
xiaiw1−σi φij
∑k∈N xkakw1−σk φkj
ej ∀i ∈ N , (34)
where heterogeneities in a arises from local productivity differences. We can show that
G\(χ) > 0 for all χ ∈ (0, 1). When the equilibrium is unique, δ′(χ) > 0 and thus
ρ′(φ) < 0. 
Example 6.4. The Krugman model (Example 2.2) is a Class I model. When one interprets
immobile demand l = (li)i∈N in the Krugman model as regional characteristic, we have
G\(χ) > 0 for all χ ∈ (0, 1). Further, δ′(χ) < 0, so that ρ′(φ) > 0 whenever x¯ is stable. 
Examples 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 demonstrate that the class a model belongs to can gov-
ern whether the endogenous causation of the model boosts the exogenous advantages
when interregional transportation costs decrease. When interregional access improves, the
endogenous mechanisms of a model strengthens (weakens) the effects of exogenous local
advantages if themodel has only a global (local) dispersion force. If exogenous heterogene-
ity causes one region to attract more population, such effects will be magnified (reduced)
for Class I (II) models.
The qualitative differences between Classes I and II can be understood from the basic
properties of the local and global dispersion forces in Section 2.4. For a Class I model, a
larger φ means a relatively smaller global dispersion force, which tends to amplify (both
the endogenous and exogenous) location-specific advantages towards the concentration
of mobile agents. However, in a Class II model, a larger φ means a relatively larger local
dispersion force, which reduces not only the benefit from concentration due to endogenous
agglomeration externalities but also that due to location-specific exogenous advantages.
Figure 14 reports numerical examples for theN = 8 case. As inExample 6.1,wemultiply
positive term a1 ≥ 1 by the payoff in region 1, whereas we let ai = 1 for all i 6= 1. The
curves depicts region 1’s population share, x1, at stable equilibria against φ. We consider
four incremental settings, a1 ∈ {1.000, 1.001, 1.005, 1.010}, including the baseline case with
no location-fixed advantage (a1 = 1.000). Figure 14a reports the evolutionary paths of x1
32
(a) The Allen–Arkolakis model (b) The Krugman model
Figure 14: Population share of region 1 and covariance ρ
for the Allen–Arkolakis model (Class II) under the uniqueness of the equilibrium. We have
δ′(χ) > 0 for all χ ∈ (0, 1) and see that x1 − x¯ > 0 when a1 > 1 and x1 − x¯ increases as a1
increases, which are intuitive. Additionally, x1 − x¯ decreases as φ increases. We confirm
that ρ(φ) > 0 and ρ′(φ) < 0 for all φ. Even when the equilibrium can be nonunique in
the Allen–Arkolakis model, we still have ρ(φ) > 0 and ρ′(φ) < 0 for all φ so that x¯ is
stable, as Proposition 2 predicts.31 Figure 14b considers the Krugman model (Class I),
where the model parameters are the same as in Figure 10.32 For all a1 > 1, x1 − x¯ > 0. As
Proposition 2 predicts, for all φ so that x¯ is stable, that is, φ ∈ (0, φ∗), we confirm ρ(φ) > 0
and ρ′(φ) > 0. Although Proposition 2 does not cover φ ∈ (φ∗, 1), ρ′(φ) > 0 holds true
except for the transitional phase after φ∗∗.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we introduce the dichotomy between “local” and “global” dispersion forces
under a general framework that encompasses a wide range of extant economic geography
models. We show that the spatial scale of the dispersion force in a model significantly
affects the endogenous spatial patterns and comparative statics of that model. Three
prototypical model classes are defined according to the spatial scale(s) of their dispersion
31Proposition 2 does not cover the case when x¯ is unstable. Accordingly, ρ′(φ) < 0 does not necessarily
holds true when x¯ is unstable. See Remark C.8 in Appendix C.
32Unlike in the Allen–Arkolakis model, the Krugman model admits multiple equilibria for some φ for any
pair of the structural parameters (µ, σ).
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forces (i.e., local, global, and local and global). Given the knowledge of the spatial scale of
dispersion forces, we provide consistent interpretations to the empirical literature and
provide qualitative characterizations of the comparative statics of structural economic
geography models. We also hope our results and methods can be extended to achieve
a unified understanding of the robust properties of a broader class of economic geography
models.
There are two major directions for further research. First, the generalization of the
theoretical results to asymmetric proximity structures is of importance. Anefficient strategy
would be to fix a few representative models—instead of geography—as test pilots and
identify general insights when proximity matrixD varies systematically, as in Matsuyama
(2017).33 The basic implications of Proposition 1 for the polarity of endogenous spatial
patterns—a single megacity or multiple cities—may well be robust to the generalizations
of an assumedgeographyby incorporating, for example, thepresence of boundaries and/or
two-dimensional location spaces (see Appendix D).
Second, apart from exploring exogenous asymmetries, the symmetric racetrack geog-
raphy can be used as a standard testbed to investigate the implications of endogenous
mechanisms for a given model. For instance, Dingel et al. (2018) employed a circular geog-
raphy to theoretically characterize thewelfare effects of exogenous productivity differences
under a standard international trade model. Another important topic is the consideration
of multiple types of mobile agents that are subject to different proximity matrices and/or
different degrees of increasing returns.34
33This line of research has already been tackled by the authors, such as in Ikeda et al. (2017b) (line segment);
Ikeda et al. (2014, 2017a, 2018) (two-dimensional regular lattices), confirming that Class I models generally
feature stable many-cities patterns.
34Such a structure is ubiquitous in intra-city models with both firms and households (e.g., urban models
of Fujita and Ogawa, 1982) or in multiple-sector models (Fujita et al., 1999b). A circular geography provides
a canonical starting point for this type of models (Tabuchi and Thisse, 2011; Osawa and Akamatsu, 2019).
See Remark C.9 in Appendix C for detailed discussions.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We characterize stability of x¯ = (x¯, x¯, . . . , x¯) and the destabilization of, and bifurcation from,
it. Appendix E collects the technical facts referenced in the following.
Part 1 (Stability of x¯). To define stability of x¯, somemyopic dynamics must be assumed4.
A myopic dynamic describes the rate of change in x. Denote the dynamic that adjusts x
over X by x˙ = f (x), where x˙ represents the time derivative. For the majority of myopic
dynamics in the literature, f (x) ≡ f˜ (x, v(x)) where f˜ maps each pair (x, v(x)) of a state
and its associated payoff to a motion vector x˙. We will focus exclusively on such dynamics.
Let restricted equilibrium be a state x∗ ∈ X such that vj(x∗) = vk(x∗) for all j, k ∈ {i ∈ N |
x∗i > 0}, that is, a spatial distribution in which all populated regions earn the same payoff
level. A spatial equilibrium is always a restricted equilibrium.
We assume that f and f˜ are differentiable and satisfy:
f (x) = 0 if and only if x is a restricted equilibrium, (RS)
if f (x) 6= 0, then v(x)> f (x) > 0, and (PC)
P f˜ (x, v(x)) = f˜ (Px,Pv(x)) for all permutation matrices P such that PD = DP. (Sym)
We call dynamics that satisfy (RS), (PC), and (Sym) admissible dynamics. See Remark C.4 in
Appendix C for examples of admissible dynamics. The conditions (RS) and (PC) ensure
that f is consistent with the underlying economic geographymodel v. The condition (Sym)
ensures that f is consistent with Assumption S, since it implies that P f (x) = f (Px) for all
permutation matrix P such that PD = DP.
A rest point x∗ of f (i.e., x∗ ∈ X such that f (x∗) = 0) is said to be linearly stable if all the
eigenvalues {ηk} of ∇ f (x∗) = [ ∂ fi∂xj (x∗)], the Jacobian matrix of f at x∗, have negative real
parts. A spatial equilibrium x∗ is said to be stable (unstable) if and only if it is linearly stable
(unstable) under admissible dynamics.
Consider x¯. We assume that x¯ is an isolated spatial equilibrium. Then, (PC) implies
that there is a neighborhood O ⊂ X of x¯ such that v(x)> f (x) > 0 for all x ∈ O \ {x¯}. By
expanding v and f about x¯, we see
(v(x¯) +∇v(x¯)z)> ( f (x¯) +∇ f (x¯)z) > 0. (A.1)
Note that v(x¯) = v¯1, ∇v(x¯) = v¯x¯V, f (x¯) = 0 by (RS), and 1>∇ f (x¯)z = 0. The last
relationship 1>∇ f (x¯)z = 0 follows because x˙ = f (x) ≈ f (x¯) +∇ f (z¯)z = ∇ f (x¯)z and
1> x˙ = ∑i∈N x˙i = 0 must hold true for all x, since the total mass of agents is a constant.
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From (A.1), we then see
v¯
x¯ (Vz)
> (∇ f (x¯)z) > 0 (A.2)
for any infinitesimal migration z = x− x¯ from the uniform distribution.
Because we consider canonical models, there is a rational function G(t) = G
](t)
G[(t)
such
that V = G(D¯) = G[(D¯)−1G](D¯), where G](t) and G[(t) are some polynomials. We
assume G[(t) > 0, so that G](t) is a net gain function. D¯ is real, symmetric, and circulant
matrix under Assumption RE (see Appendix E). Then, by Fact E.2,V is real, symmetric, and
circulant matrix. Because of (Sym), ∇ f (x¯) is also real, symmetric, and circulant matrix.
Then, by Fact E.3, D, V, and ∇ f (x¯) share the same set of eigenvectors {zk}.
For every eigenvector zk (of D, V, or ∇ f (x¯)), (A.2) implies that
(Vzk)
> (∇ f (x¯)zk) = ωkηk > 0, (A.3)
where ωk and ηk are the (real) eigenvalues of V and ∇ f (x¯) associated with zk. Thus,
sgn[ηk] = sgn[ωk] = sgn[G](χk(φ))]. Therefore, x¯ is stable spatial equilibrium if and only
if ω]k ≡ G](χk(φ)) < 0 for all k. Note that ηk and ωk are both real because∇ f (x¯) andV are
both symmetric.
If the eigenpairs {(χk, zk)} of the row-normalized proximity matrix D¯ are available,
then the eigenpairs of V = G(D¯) are given by {(G(χk), zk)} (see Fact E.1). We have the
following lemma:
Lemma A.1. Assume that N is an even and let M ≡ N2 . Then, D¯ satisfies the following
properties:
(a) There are M+ 1 distinct eigenvalues. The eigenpairs {(χk, zk)} are
χ0 = 1, z0 ≡ 〈1〉N−1i=0 , (A.4)
χk,
z+k ≡ 〈cos(θki)〉N−1i=0 ,z−k ≡ 〈sin(θki)〉N−1i=0 , k = 1, 2, . . . , M− 1 (A.5)
χM, zM ≡ 〈(−1)i〉N−1i=0 . (A.6)
where θ = 2piN , and by 〈zi〉N−1i=0 ≡ 1‖z‖ (zi)N−1i=0 we denote a normalized vector.
(b) Every χk (k 6= 0) is a differentiable strictly decreasing function of φwith limφ→0 χk = 1
and limφ→1 χk = 0.
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(c) For all φ, {χk} (k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , M) are ordered as1 = χ0 > χ2 > · · · > χ2k > · · · > χM > 0,1 > χ1 > χ3 > · · · > χ2k+1 > · · · > χM−1 > 0, (A.7)
with χ0 > χ1 > χ2, so that maxk≥1{χk} = χ1.
(d) If N is a multiple of four, mink{χk} = χM =
(
1−φ
1+φ
)2
and χ1 =
1−φ
1+φ .
Proof. See Fact E.3, Remark C.5, and Akamatsu et al. (2012) (Lemma 4.2).
Thus, x¯ is stable if ω]k ≡ G](χk(φ)) < 0 for all k ∈ K ≡ {1, 2, . . . , M}. We can exclude
k = 0 because z0 represents an increase of total population.
RemarkA.1. AssumptionREassumes thatN is amultiple of four to ensure thatmink∈K{χk} =
χM. The essential implication of Proposition 1 on the polarity of spatial patterns does not
alter because mink∈K{χk} = min{χM−1,χM} by Lemma A.1 (c). 
Refer to Figure A.1, which shows {ω]k}, G](χ), and {χk}, to understand the following
arguments.
Class I. By assumption, there is χ∗ such that G](χ) < 0 for all χ ∈ (χ∗, 1), that
G](χ∗) = 0, and that G](χ) > 0 for all χ ∈ (0,χ∗). By Lemma C.1, {χk(φ)} are strictly
decreasing from 1. Therefore, x¯ is stable if and only if χk ∈ (χ∗, 1), so thatω]k ≡ G](χk) < 0,
for all k ∈ K, i.e., if χ∗ < mink∈K χk = χM. Thus, x¯ is stable for all (0, φ∗M) where
φ∗M =
1−√χ∗
1+
√
χ∗ is the unique solution for χM = χ
∗. Because G](χ) > 0 for all χ ∈ (0,χ∗) and
χM is strictly decreasing, x¯ is unstable for all (φ∗M, 1) because ω
]
M > 0 for the range.
Class II. By assumption, there is χ∗∗ such that G](χ) < 0 for all χ ∈ (0,χ∗∗), that
G](χ∗∗) = 0, and that G](χ∗∗) > 0 for all χ ∈ (χ∗∗, 1). Thus, x¯ is stable if and only if
χk ∈ (0,χ∗∗), so that ω]k = G](χk) < 0, for all k ∈ K, i.e., if χ∗∗ > maxk∈K χk = χ1. Thus,
x¯ is stable for all (φ∗1 , 1) where φ∗1 ≡ 1−χ
∗∗
1+χ∗∗ is the unique solution for χ1 = χ
∗∗. Because
G](χ) > 0 for all χ ∈ (χ∗∗, 1) and χ1 is strictly decreasing, x¯ is unstable for all (0, φ∗1).
Class III. Via a similar logic, we see x¯ is stable if φ ∈ (0, φ∗M) ∪ (φ∗1 , 1).
Part 2 (Bifurcation from x¯). Start from a state where x¯ is stable. When one and only one
ωk (k ∈ K) switches its sign from negative to positive at φ∗k , then, from (A.3), ηk must switch
its sign from negative to positive at φ∗k . It is a standard fact in bifurcation theory that, at
such point, x¯must deviate towards the direction of corresponding eigenvector zk. See, e.g.,
Hirsch et al. (2012) and Kuznetsov (2004). That is, M = N2 cities emerge at φ
∗
M, whereas a
single city emerges at φ∗∗1 .
Remark A.2. The bifurcation toward the single-city direction (k = 1) is a double bifurcation
at which the relevant eigenvalue, ω1, has multiplicity two, as seen from (A.5). For this
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c0 φ∗∗ = φ∗1 φ
∗ = φ∗M
− log(φ)
χk
ω]k = G
](χk)
c0
0
1
0 − log(φ)
G](χ)
0
χ
χ∗∗
χ∗ χ1
χ2 χM
ω]1

ω]M

Figure A.1: Net gain function G](χ) and net agglomeration forces ω]k
Notes: Top: Graphs of ω]k = G
](χk). Bottom left: Net gain function G] for Class III models with a
quadratic net gain function of the formG](χ) = c0 + c1χ+ c2χ2. Note thatG](0) = c0. Bottom right:
The eigenvalues {χk(φ)} of D¯, which are model-independent. x¯ is stable in the shaded regions of
φ or χ. For φ, log scale is used for better readability. Note that max{χk} = χ1 and min{χk} = χM
at any given level of φ.
case, possible migration patterns are linear combinations of the form c+z+1 + c
−z−1 with
c+, c− ∈ R. In fact, we have (c+, c−) = (c, 0) or (c, c) for some c ∈ R under admissible
dynamics along with Assumptions RE and S. Because any linear combination of z+1 and
z−1 is a one-peaked cosine curve, it is still interpreted as a single-city pattern. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The equilibrium condition when all regions are populated is given by
v(x, a)− v¯(x, a)1 = 0, (A.8)
where v¯(x, a) ≡ ∑i∈N vi(x, a)xi is the average payoff and 1 is N-dimensional all-one vector.
The pair (x¯, a¯) is a solution to (A.8). When a = a¯ + e with small e = (ei)i∈N , there is
a spatial equilibrium nearby x¯ because v is differentiable. Let x(a) denote the perturbed
version of the uniform distribution, which is a function in a. In the following, we consider
some level of φ such that x¯ is stable, because otherwise studying a perturbed version of x¯
is meaningless.
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The covariance ρ discussed in Section 6 is evaluated as follows:
ρ ≡ (a− a¯)> (x(a)− x¯) = (Ca)>Cx(a) = a>Cx(a) (A.9)
whereC ≡ I− 1N11> is theN-dimensional centeringmatrix. LetX ≡ [ ∂xi∂aj (a¯)] is the Jacobian
matrix of xwith respect to a evaluated at (x¯, a¯) Then, x(a) ≈ x¯+X(a− a¯) = x¯+XCa and
ρ = a>CXCa (A.10)
since Cx¯ = 0. The implicit function theorem regarding (A.8) at (x¯, a¯) gives:
X = −
(
Vx − 1x¯>Vx − 1v(x¯)>
)−1 (
Va − 1x¯>Va
)
(A.11)
=
(
v¯
x¯
1
N11
> −
(
I− 1N11>
)
Vx
)−1 (
I− 1N11>
)
Va (A.12)
= x¯v¯
(
(I−C)−C x¯v¯Vx
)−1 C v¯a¯ a¯v¯Va (A.13)
= x¯a¯ ((I−C)−CV)−1 CA (A.14)
where v¯ is the uniform level of payoff, Vx ≡ [ ∂vi∂xj (x¯, a¯)], Va ≡ [
∂vi
∂aj
(x¯, a¯)], V ≡ x¯v¯Vx, and
A ≡ a¯v¯Va, and we note x¯ = 1N . Under Assumptions RE, S, and A, the matrix X is real,
symmetric, and circulant because all its components in (A.14) are.
The set of eigenvectors of CXC can be chosen as the same as in Lemma C.1 (a) because
it is a circulant matrix of the same size as D¯ (see Fact E.3). Let {λk}Mk=0 be the distinct
eigenvalues of CXC. Because CXC is symmetric, CXC admits the following eigenvalue
decomposition:
CXC = λ011> +
M−1
∑
k=1
λk
(
z+k z
+
k
>
+ z−k z
−
k
>)
+ λMzMz>M, (A.15)
which yields the following representation of ρ:
ρ = a>CXCa = ∑
k 6=0
a˜2kλk. (A.16)
where a˜ ≡ (a˜k) is the representation of a in the new coordinate system.35 We can omit
k = 0 since λ0 = 0, which reflects that z0 = 1 represents a uniform increase in a and
thus is inconsequential. In concrete terms, as all the component matrices in (A.14) are
circulant matrices and hence shares the same set of eigenvectors, we can translate the
35Observe that this representation implies upper and lower bounds for ρ when a 6= a¯, namely, ‖a −
a¯‖λmin ≤ ρ ≤ ‖a− a¯‖λmax where λmin ≡ mink≥1{λk} and λmax ≡ maxk≥1{λk}.
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matrix relationship (A.14) to the following expression:
λk =
x¯
a¯
((1− κk)− κkωk)−1 κkαk, (A.17)
where κk, ωk = G(χk), and αk are the kth eigenvalues of C,V, andA, respectively. We have
κ0 = 0 and κk = 1 for all k 6= 0, thereby λk = − x¯a¯ αkωk for all k 6= 0. Also, under the condition
that A = G\(D¯), we have αk = G\(χk). Summing up, we have
λk = − x¯a¯
G\(χk)
G(χk)
=
x¯
a¯
δ(χk) ∀k ∈ K, (A.18)
and λ0 = 0 where δ(χ) ≡ −G
\(χ)
G(χ) , and {χk}k∈K are the eigenvalues of D¯.
Thus, ρ > 0 for all a if all {λk} are positive except for λ0 = 0. The denominator of
(A.18), G(χk), must be negative for all k because x¯ is stable by assumption. Thus, we see
that ρ > 0 if G\(χ) > 0 for all χ since χk ∈ (0, 1) for all k ∈ K.
Proposition 2 follows by noting that
ρ′(φ) = ∑
k 6=0
a˜2k
dλk
dφ
=
x¯
a¯ ∑k 6=0
a˜2kδ
′(χk)
dχk
dφ
= − x¯
a¯ ∑k 6=0
a˜2kδ
′(χk)
∣∣∣∣dχkdφ
∣∣∣∣ ,
where we recall that {χk}k∈K are strictly decreasing in φ (Lemma A.1). If δ′(χ) < 0
(δ′(χ) > 0) for all relevant χ, then ρ′(φ) > 0 (ρ′(φ) < 0).
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Supplementary Materials
December 12, 2019
By Takashi Akamatsu, Tomoya Mori, Minoru Osawa, and Yuki Takayama
We collect additional results, technical preliminaries, and various remarks that are refer-
enced in the main text or proofs. Appendix B provides the summary of the Japan example
in Section 1. Appendix C collects lengthy remarks. Appendix D provides discussions
pertaining to the relaxation of the racetrack assumption (Assumption RE). Appendix E col-
lects relevant facts frommatrix analysis employed in the proofs (Appendix A). Appendix F
collects supporting computations for the example models discussed in the main text.
B Cities in Japan: 1970–2015
Data. Population count data of Japan, obtained from Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal
Affairs and Communications of Japan (1970, 2015).
Method. A city is represented by an urban agglomeration (UA), which is the set of
contiguous 1 km-by-1 km cells with a population density of at least 1000/km2 and total
population of at least 10,000. The basic results below remain the same for alternative
threshold densities and populations.
Below, UA i in year s is said to be associated withUA j in year t ( 6= s) if the intersection of
the spatial coverage of i and that of j accounts for the largest population of i among all the
UAs in year t. For years s < t, if i and j are associated with each other, they are considered
to be the same UA. If i is associated with j but not vice versa, then i is considered to have
been absorbed into j, while if j is associated with i but not vice versa, then j is considered
to have separated from i. If i is not associated with any UA in year t, then i is considered
to have disappeared by year t, while if j is not associated with any UA in year s, then j is
considered to have newly emerged by year t.
For the part of Japan contiguous by roads to at least one of the four major islands
(Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu), 503 and 450 UAs are identified, as depicted
in Panels (a) and (b) of Figure B.1 for 1970 and 2015, respectively, where the warmer
color indicates a larger population. These together account for 64% and 78% of the total
population in 1970 and 2015, respectively. Thus, there is a substantial 18% increase in the
urban share over these 40 years. Of the 503 UAs that existed in 1970, 302 survived, while
201 either disappeared or integrated with other UAs by 2015. Of the 450 UAs that existed
in 2015, 148 were newly formed after 1970 (including those split from existing UAs).
A1
Panels (c) and (d) of Figure B.1 show the highway and high-speed railway networks in
use in 1970 and 2015, respectively. The comparison of these panels indicates an obvious
substantial expansion of these networks during these 45 years, as mentioned in the text.
Panels (a), (b), and (c) of Figure B.2 show the distributions of the growth rates of
population share (in the national population), the areal size and population density of
individual UAs for the set of the 302 UAs that survived throughout the 45-year period.
A UA experienced an average growth rate of 21% (75%) of population share, 94% (105%)
of areal size, and −22% (22%) of population density (per km2), respectively, where the
numbers in parentheses are the standard deviations.
As a larger population share was concentrated in a smaller number of UAs in 2015 than
in 1970, the spatial size of an individual UA almost doubled on average. However, these
spatial expansions are not simply due to the shortage of available land in UAs. Note that
population density decreased by 22% on average. We take this as evidence of a decline
in the number of major population concentrations combined with local flattening of each
concentration in the course of the improvement in interregional transport access.
A2
(a) Urban agglomrations in 1970 (b) Urban agglomrations in 2015
(c) Highway and high-speed railway network in 1970 (d) Highway and high-speed railway network in 2015
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Figure B.1: UAs and transport network in Japan
(a) Population share growth (b) Area growth (c) Population density growth
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Average = 0.94
Standard deviation = 1.05
Average = -0.22
Standard deviation = 0.22
Figure B.2: Growth rates of the sizes of UAs in Japan.
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C Additional remarks
This appendix collects lengthy remarks which may benefit interested readers.
Remark C.1. Section 2.1 and Definition 1 define canonical models. Canonical models do
not include: (i) models with multiple types of mobile agents such as the urban models
of Fujita and Ogawa (1982); Ota and Fujita (1993); Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002) as
well as Ahlfeldt et al. (2015); Owens et al. (forthcoming); (ii) models with sector-wise
differentiated spatial frictions such as Fujita and Krugman (1995) and Mori (1997); (iii)
models with multiple types of increasing returns such as Fujita et al. (1999b); Tabuchi
and Thisse (2011), and Hsu (2012); and (iv) dynamic models such as Desmet and Rossi-
Hansberg (2009, 2014, 2015); Desmet et al. (2018). Also, we do not cover models that build
on Ottaviano et al. (2002) (OTT) framework, which assumes a quadratic preference and
linear trade frictions. The OTT framework is not a canonical model as per Definition 1,
because the model induces V of the form
V = c0I+ c1D¯+ c2D¯2 + cˆ1D[2], (C.1)
where D[2] ≡ [d2ij]. That is, there is no rational function G such that V = G(D¯) due to the
existence of the special matrix,D[2]. We can still show that c2 < 0, thereby the model has a
global dispersion force. Also, under Assumptions RE and S, local stability analysis of x¯ in
the OTT framework can be done analytically. However, since the OTT framework assumes
linear transport costs, the analysis can incorporate tiresome parametric classifications to
handle possible corner solutions in market equilibrium (e.g., the cases where there are no
interregional transport for some pairs of regions). 
Remark C.2. On Proposition 1, the payoff function is assumed to be homogeneous across
mobile agents. The effects of considering idiosyncratic payoff shocks are of interest, since
it is a standard recipe in quantitative exercises (Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017). We
note that such idiosyncratic heterogeneity acts as a local dispersion force. It is a well-known
fact that random utility models can be represented on the basis of deterministic utility
(Anderson et al., 1992). Suppose that the idiosyncratic payoff function is defined by
vˆni(x) = eniv˜i(x)where eni is a random payoff shock for an individual agent n for choosing
region i that are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to a Frèchet
distribution, and v˜i(x) is the homogeneous component; a spatial equilibrium for this case
is defined by xi = Pri(x) where Pri(x) ≡ Pr
(
i = arg maxj∈N vˆnj(x)
) ∈ (0, 1) denotes
the probability for an agent to choose region i when the current spatial distribution is
x. Then, there is a deterministic (or homogeneous) payoff function v(x) = (vi(x))i∈N ,
associated with the stochastic (or heterogeneous) payoff function (vˆni(x)), such that x∗ is a
deterministic spatial equilibrium under v(x) if and only if it satisfies x∗i = Pri(x
∗). In this
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sense, the two spatial equilibriumconcepts are “isomorphic” in terms of equilibrium spatial
distribution of agents. Local stability of equilibria under this kind of perturbed version of
equilibrium condition can be investigated by the associated perturbed best response dynamics.
See Sandholm (2010) for a unified discussion.
Let V˜ ≡ ∇v˜(x¯) be the Jacobianmatrix of thehomogeneous component of heterogeneous
payoff. Then, V˜ and the Jacobian matrix of deterministic version of payoff function, V =
∇v(x¯), are connected via the relationship
V = V˜− ηI, (C.2)
where η is a constant which is proportional to the dispersion parameter for the distribution
eni are drawn from. The formula implies that η appears as a negative constant term in the
net gain function G] for v. That is, idiosyncratic payoff shock acts as a local dispersion
force. This is a natural consequence of assuming that eni is i.i.d. over n and i. The
idiosyncratic payoff shock acts as some kind of dispersion force, but it has no connection
to the underlying geography. As such, introducing idiosyncratic payoff shocks to a Class I
model can, in effect, change the model to Class III. 
RemarkC.3. On Proposition 1, We consider stability undermyopic dynamics. An important
venue of extension is to consider the forward-looking behavior ofmobile agents in the spirit
of Krugman (1991a). A rigorous theory on this issue can be found in Oyama (2009a,b). The
papers explored an economic geography model subject to a deterministic perfect foresight
dynamic, in which agents have a complete anticipation capability for the future; it is shown
that the forward-looking behavior also drive the spatial distribution towards a state that
is also locally stable under myopic dynamics when the future discount rate is high. That
said, employing myopic dynamics for equilibrium refinement can also be interpreted as an
approximation of forward-looking dynamics with a high discount rate.
Related to this, a recent literature on geography and development features an explicitly
dynamic decision of mobile agents in the (discrete) time axis, with the anticipation capa-
bility of agents is supposed to be limited in favor of tractability (i.e., the discount rate for
future utility is high) (Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg, 2009, 2014; Nagy, 2017; Desmet et al.,
2018). One might be interested in how these dynamic models can be related to determin-
istic myopic dynamics. In this context, we note that “myopic” dynamics are interpreted as
the average behavior of the behavioral assumptions imposed on agents’ strategy switch-
ing protocol, or “revision protocol” (Sandholm, 2010). The question is, then, what is the
average aggregate behavior induced by a dynamic economic geography model when we
interpret the agent’s dynamic choice in the time axis as the revision protocol of a hypo-
thetical myopic dynamic. A similar discussion applies to overlapping generation models
(e.g., Allen and Donaldson, 2018). It requires a model-by-model investigation and calls for
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another theory of independent interest. 
Remark C.4. On admissible dynamics defined in Appendix A.1, the conditions (RS) and
(PC) are, respectively, called restricted stationality and positive correlation (Sandholm, 2010),
which are the most minimal assumptions we can impose on a dynamic f to be “consistent”
with the underlying model v. Also, the symmetry assumption (Sym) ensures that the
dynamic does not feature ex-ante preference over alternatives N . We assume f is defined
for all nonnegative orthant RN≥0 to avoid unnecessary technical complication. Also, we
suppose f is C1 only because we employ linear stability as the definition of stability.
Admissible C1 myopic dynamics specified by the conditions (RS), (PC), and (Sym) in-
clude, for instance, theBrown–vonNeumann–Nash dynamic (Brown and vonNeumann, 1950;
Nash, 1951), the Smith dynamic (Smith, 1984), and Riemannian game dynamics (Mertikopou-
los and Sandholm, 2018) that satisfy (Sym), e.g., the Euclidian projection dynamic (Dupuis
and Nagurney, 1993) and the replicator dynamic (Taylor and Jonker, 1978). See Sandholm
(2010) for more examples. Also, we note that Proposition 1 can be extended to include the
best response dynamic (Gilboa andMatsui, 1991), which is generally nondifferentiable. 
Remark C.5. DefineD = [φij] by φij = φ`ij with `ij ≡ {|i− j|, N− |i− j|}. The eigenvalues
{χk} of D¯ are given by the following lemma.
Lemma C.1. Assume that N is an even and let M ≡ N2 . Define
Ψk(φ) ≡ 1− φ
2
1− 2φ cos[θk] + φ2 and Ψ¯(φ) ≡
1+ φM
1− φM (C.3)
with θ = 2piN . Then,
χk(φ) =
Ψk(φ)ΨM(φ) (k: even)Ψk(φ)ΨM(φ)Ψ¯(φ) (k: odd) k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , M. (C.4)
See Lemma 4.2 of Akamatsu et al. (2012). 
Remark C.6. The following lemma is useful for characterizing the stability of x¯. Notations
are the same as Appendix A.1.
Lemma C.2. x¯ is linearly stable under all admissible dynamics if and only if:
z>Vz < 0 ∀z ∈ TX \ {0} (CND)
where TX ≡ {z ∈ RN | 1>z = 0}.
Proof. From Fact E.3,V has N2 + 1 distinct eigenvalues {ωk}
N
2
k=0. ω0 is associated to 1, which
is orthogonal to TX . Thus, (CND) is equivalent to ωk < 0 for all k 6= 0. Then, from (A.3),
ηk < 0 for all k 6= 0, which is the definition of linear stability of x¯. 
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Figure C.1: Bifurcation in Class II model with exogenous heterogeneity
Notes: The black solid curves indicate stable equilibria, whereas the dashed curves unstable equilib-
ria. For the range φ ∈ (φ∗∗, 1) (φ∗∗ ≈ 0.43), there are two large cities due to exogenous advantages.
However, when endogenous agglomeration occurs, the spatial distribution become single-peaked,
as Proposition 1 (b) predicts.
Sections 2.2, 2.3, and 4 builds on LemmaC.2. For instance, (CND) is equivalent toω < 0
in the two-region setup. 
Remark C.7. In Appendix A.2, the expression (A.18) provides an intuition for what pattern
can emerge in the presence of small heterogeneities in local characteristics. Suppose that
φ∗k is a value of φ at which x¯ changes its stability from stable to unstable under complete
symmetry, resulting in adeviation towards k-cities direction (k = 1or k = N2 ). Bydefinition,
G(χk(φ∗k )) ≈ 0 near such φ∗k . Combined with the condition G\(χk) > 0, it implies that
λk become infinitely large as φ approaches to φ∗k ; if a = a¯1 + a˜kzk, then linearization
x(a) ∼ x¯+X(a− a¯) = x¯+ a˜kλkzk predicts that spatial pattern x(a) almost “kinks” towards
k-cities pattern. This is another manifestation of Proposition 1 in that the instability of x¯ at
φ∗k implies the formation of k cities.
That said, small heterogeneities do not affect the predictions of Proposition 1. Fig-
ure C.1 illustrates that although local advantage can induce “multipolar” distribution in a
Class II model, such spatial pattern vanish to form a single megacity when endogenous ag-
glomeration force matters. The topic here is related to the so-called universal unfolding and
there is an enormous body of general theory that justifies and generalizes the casual obser-
vation we have drawn here. See Golubitsky and Stewart (2003), Golubitsky and Schaeffer
(2012), and Golubitsky et al. (2012). See also Ikeda and Murota (2014) for applications. 
Remark C.8. Figure C.2 depicts the population share of region 1 under asymmetry as
considered in Figure 14 in the main text. Basic model parameters are the same as Figure 10
and Figure 11 except that region 1 has exogenous advantage. Figure C.2a is a reproduction
of Figure 14b, whereas FigureC.2b considers theAAmodel undermultiplicity of equilibria.
For both figures, we see that Proposition 2 correctly predicts the sign of ρ′(φ) for the range
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(a) The Krugman model (b) The Allen–Arkolakis model
Figure C.2: Population share of region 1 and covariance ρ
of φ such that x¯ is stable when a1 = 1. We have ρ′(φ) > 0 when φ ∈ (0, φ∗) for the Km
model, whereas ρ′(φ) < 0 when φ ∈ (φ∗∗, 1) for the AA model.
For Figure C.2a, we modify the definition of ρ for spatial patterns with unpopulated
regions. For instance, for the rangeφ ∈ (φ∗, φ∗∗), wedefine ρwith respect to the four-centric
pattern (2x¯, 0, 2x¯, 0, 2x¯, 0, 2x¯, 0):
ρ ≡ ∑
i∈I(x)
(xi − 2x¯)(ai − a¯(x)), (C.5)
where I(x¯) = {i ∈ I | xi > 0} is the set of populated regions, and a¯(x) ≡ 1|I(x¯)| ∑i∈I(x) ai.
Wedefine ρ for two-centric pattern (4x¯, 0, 0, 0, 4x¯, 0, 0, 0) in a similarway. For the transitional
phase after φ∗∗ we let
ρ ≡ ∑
i∈I(x)
(xi − x∗i )(ai − a¯(x)), (C.6)
where x∗i corresponds to the stable solution for a1 = 1. Note that ρ = (x1− 1)(a1− a1) = 0
for the complete monopolar pattern (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0). It is natural that we have ρ′(φ) > 0
for the four- and two-centric patterns because these patterns can be regarded as the uniform
distribution on the four- and two-region cases, respectively.
For Figure C.2b, we employ (C.6) as the definition of ρ for the case φ ∈ (0, φ∗∗), i.e., we
consider the deviation from the baseline equilibrium (a1 = 1). We observe that ρ′(φ) < 0
does not necessarily hold true for φ ∈ (0, φ∗∗). In particular, ρ′(φ) > 0 when local
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dispersion force is relatively weak (when φ is small). 
Remark C.9. Many economic geographymodels are subject tomultiple proximitymatrices
and/or different degrees of increasing returns. We here discuss three major categories of
economic geography models that can be studied by imposing racetrack assumptions.
One major strand of research in this line aims to explain the formation of the (possibly
multiple) business districts together with residential land use and commuting patterns
within a city. These intra-city models typically distinguish location behavior of firms and
households (e.g., Fujita and Ogawa, 1982; Ota and Fujita, 1993; Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg,
2002; Ahlfeldt et al., 2015; Owens et al., forthcoming; Heblich et al., 2018; Osawa and
Akamatsu, 2019).
Another possibility is to consider different transport cost structures by industry. For
example, Fujita and Krugman (1995) introduced transport costs for land-intensive rural
goods along with those of urban goods. In the presence of rural goods that are costly
to transport, the delivered price for such goods is lower in regions farther away from the
agglomerations, which generates a dispersion force. This is similar to the local dispersion
force in that even a small deviation from an urban agglomeration will decrease the price of
rural goods and increase the payoff of the deviant. However, the advantage of dispersion
persists outside the agglomeration, i.e., it depends on the distance structure of the model.
This type of dispersion force is known to result in the formation of an industrial belt, a contin-
uum of agglomeration associated with multiple atoms of agglomeration as demonstrated
by the simulations in Mori (1997) and Ikeda et al. (2017b). The formal characterization of
industrial belts remains to be carried out.
The last relevant direction of research is the formalization of the classical central place
theory ofChristaller (1933)which investigates the diversity in sizes togetherwith the spatial
patterns of cities (e.g., Fujita et al., 1999b; Tabuchi and Thisse, 2011). It is an extension of
Class I models by multiple industries subject to different degrees of increasing returns
and/or transport costs.36 As in Class I models, agglomerations of each industry are spaced
apart from one another, but their spacing is larger for industries with greater increasing
returns. The key in these central place models is that industries tend to co-agglomerate as
they share demand externaltities through common consumers. As a consequence, there
is a hierarchical structure in industrial agglomeration pattern: more localized industries
(with greater increasing returns) tend to co-agglomerate with more ubiquitous ones (with
smaller increasing returns). Since larger cities are formed at locations in which a larger
number of industries co-agglomerate, the size diversity and spatial patterns of cities are
determined by the spatial coordination of industries.
36Hsu (2012) proposes an alternative formalization of central place theory in the context of spatial com-
petition and firm entry. Davis and Dingel (2019) offer an alternative mechanism of spatial coordination
among industries which in turn results in hierarchy principle and the diversity in city sizes in the context of
a systems-of-cities model that abstracts from inter-city space.
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Since the endogenous mechanism is the key in both these types of models, a racetrack
geography provides an ideal setup. Initial such explorations are found in Tabuchi and
Thisse (2011) and Osawa and Akamatsu (2019). 
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D On relaxing the racetrack assumption
This section highlights the implications of Proposition 1 qualitatively generalize to various
geographical set-ups (line segment, square and hexagonal lattices with/without bound-
aries). In particular, the polarity of endogenous spatial patterns in each model class is
unaffected; multiple cities can endogenously form in Class I, whereas a single city form in
Class II, when we relax Assumption RE.
The simplest way to introduce geographical asymmetry into our one-dimensional set-
up is to consider a bounded line segment, which is a standard spatial setting in urban
economic theory. For instance, Ikeda et al. (2017b) considered a Class I model by Forslid
and Ottaviano (2003) in a line segment and showed that multiple cities form in the set-
up. It is also shown that the evolution of spatial structure on such geography follows a
“period doubling” behavior, which is formally discussed for racetrack economy (Akamatsu
et al., 2012; Osawa et al., 2017), as in Figure 10. For Class II and III, Figure D.1 shows
endogenous agglomeration patterns in the Hm and PS models. Observe that for both the
models, qualitative properties of the spatial patterns are consistent with those for circular
geography (Section 5).
Also, Mossay and Picard (2011) considered a variant of Beckmann (1976)’s model (Class
II) and showed that the only possible equilibrium is a unimodal distribution, as in Fig-
ure 11.37 The numerical results of Anas and Kim (1996) and Anas et al. (1998) in line
segments bear close resemblance to, respectively, agglomeration behaviors of Class I and
II models.
The real-world geography is two-dimensional. The two-dimensional counterpart of the
racetrack economy is a bounded lattices with periodic boundary conditions (i.e., flat torus).
Ikeda et al. (2017a) and Ikeda et al. (2018) respectively considered a Class I model in two-
dimensional hexagonal and square lattices. In both lattices, it is shown that multiple cities
form and period-doubling behavior emerge from the model, as in the racetrack set-up.
See, in particular, Ikeda et al. (2018) for detailed comparison of one-dimensional racetrack
economy and two-dimensional square lattice economy. As concrete examples, Figure D.2
shows endogenous equilibrium spatial patterns over a bounded square economy with
9× 9 = 81 regions in the course of increasing φ for the Krugman and Allen–Arkolakis
models. The parameters are the same as Figure 10 and Figure 11. As Proposition 1
and Section 5 predict, the Krugman model (Class I) engender multiple disjointed cities.
When φ increases, the number of cities gradually decreases, while the spacing between
them enlarges. For the AA model (Class II), in contrast, the spatial pattern is initially
monopolar, i.e., there is a single big city. As φ increases, the city gradually flattens due
37Mossay and Picard (2011) considered a continuous line segment, in contrast to this paper and Ikeda et
al. (2017b). As shown by Akamatsu et al. (2017a), the model by Mossay and Picard (2011) can be considered
as a continuous limit of an appropriate discrete-space model.
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(a) The PS model (b) The Hm model
Figure D.1: Endogenous agglomeration patterns in a line segment with 65 regions
to suburbanization. These behaviors are qualitatively consistent with Proposition 1 and
examples in Section 5.
Also, Blanchet et al. (2016) considered a Class II model over a two-dimensional space
and showed that, for the Bm model, equilibrium spatial pattern is unique and given by a
concave regular paraboloid, i.e., an “unimodal” pattern. Picard and Tabuchi (2013) also
considered a Class II general equilibrium model in a two-dimensional space and showed
that spatial distribution become unimodal.38
38Notably, the implications of Proposition 1 seem to extend to non-iceberg transport costs that are not
covered by the specification of D in Assumption RE. In fact, Mossay and Picard (2011); Picard and Tabuchi
(2013); Blanchet et al. (2016) assume linear transport costs.
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(a) The Krugman model (b) The Allen–Arkolakis model
Figure D.2: Endogenous agglomeration patterns in a bounded square economy
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E Preliminaries from matrix analysis
This section collects the relevant facts from matrix analysis for self-containedness. For a
concise reference, see Horn and Johnson (2012) (henceforth HJ). First, we recall that when
we know the eigenpairs (eigenvalue–eigenvector pairs) of a square matrix A, we know
those of matrix polynomials based on A (see HJ, Section 1.1).
Fact E.1. Let A be a square matrix with eigenpairs {(λk, zk)}k∈K. For a finite-degree
polynomial P(t) = ∑nl=0 pltl, let P(A) be defined by P(A) = ∑
n
l=0 plA
l with A0 ≡ I.
Then, the eigenpairs of P(A) are given by {(P(λk), zk)}k∈K. Take another finite-degree
polynomial Q(t). If Q(A) is nonsingular, then the eigenpairs of Q(A)−1 are given by
{(Q(λk)−1, zk)}k∈K. Thus, the eigenpairs of the matrix G(A) ≡ Q(A)−1P(A) is given by
{(G(λk), zk)}k∈K with G(t) = P(t)Q(t) . ♦
Next, a circulant matrix C of size N generated by c = (ci)N−1i=0 is
C = circ[c] ≡

c0 c1 c2 · · · cN−2 cN−1
cN−1 c0 c1 c2 · · · cN−2
cN−2
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . c2
c2 · · · cN−2 cN−1 c0 c1
c1 c2 · · · cN−2 cN−1 c0

. (E.1)
Each row of C are identical to the previous row moved one position to the right and
wrapped around. Every row sum equals to c>1 by definition. Circulant matrices are
known to satisfy the following properties (see HJ, Section 0.9.6 and Problem 2.2.P10):
Fact E.2. Circulant matrices of size N form a commutative algebra: linear combinations
and products of circulants ar circulants; the inverse of a nonsingular circulant is a circulant;
any two circulants of the same size commute. ♦
Fact E.3. Let C = circ[c] be a real and symmetric circulant matrix of size N. Then, C is
diagonalized by an orthogonal matrix Z: diag[λ] = Z>CZ. The column vectors of the
matrix Z are the eigenvectors of C. Let θ ≡ 2piN . Eigenpairs (λk, zk) can be chosen to be
λ0 = c>1, z0 ≡ 〈1〉N−1i=0 , (E.2)
λk,
z+k ≡ 〈cos(θki)〉N−1i=0 ,z−k ≡ 〈sin(θki)〉N−1i=0 , k = 1, 2, . . . , bN2 c − 1, (E.3)
λ N
2
, z N
2
≡ 〈(−1)i〉N−1i=0 , if N is an even, (E.4)
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where 〈zi〉N−1i=0 ≡ ‖z‖−1(zi)N−1i=0 denotes the normalized version of real vector z. Thus,
the distinct eigenvalues of C are given by λ = {λk}k∈K (k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , bN2 c}). Those
eigenvalues with k = 1, 2, . . . , bN2 c − 1 are multiplicity two. z0 is a uniform vector and λ0 is
the row-sum of C; the elements of other eigenvectors sum up to zero. If in addition ci > 0
for all i and c>1 = 1, then C = circ[c] is positive and row-stochastic. We have C1 = 1 and
thus λ0 = 1; λ0 is the maximal eigenvalue (or the spectral radius) of C and 1 is the only
strictly positive eigenvector (the Perron–Frobenius theorem). Note that all real symmetric
circulant matrices of size N share the same set of eigenvectors. For general (possibly
asymmetric) circulant matrices, discrete Fourier transformation matix can be employed for
diagonalization (see, e.g., Akamatsu et al., 2012, for an application). ♦
Remark E.1. Under Assumption RE,D is a circulant matrix because φij = φ`ij = φ`i+1,j+1 =
φi+1,j+1 for all i, j (mod N for indices). 
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F Supporting computations
F.1 General observations
This section summarizesgeneral relationshipsbetweenvariouspartial derivatives. Through-
out this section, we let Fx = [ ∂ fi∂xj ] denote the partial derivative of a vector-valued function
f (x) with respect to the variable x. For instance, Vx ≡ [ ∂vi∂xj ], V˜x ≡ [
∂v˜i
∂xj
], V˜w ≡ [ ∂v˜i∂wj ],
Sx ≡ [ ∂si∂xj ], Sw ≡ [
∂si
∂wj
], andWx ≡ [ ∂wi∂xj ].
The matrix V = x¯v¯Vx. The payoff functions for most of the models we referenced in the
main text reduce to the following form:
v(x) = v˜(x,w), (F.1)
s(x,w) = 0. (F.2)
The condition (F.2) represents the market equilibrium conditions for a given x that defines
w as an implicit function of x. For v(x) to be well-defined, (F.2) must admit a unique
solution of w for all x ∈ X . We assume that (F.2) has a unique solution for all x ∈ X ◦,
where X ◦ ≡ {x ∈ X | xi > 0 ∀i ∈ N} denote the interior of X . In general, we have
Vx = V˜x + V˜wWx, (F.3)
Wx = −S−1w Sx, (F.4)
where Wx is obtained by the implicit function theorem regarding (F.2). The inverse S−1w
exists for all x ∈ X ◦ under our premise that w(x) exists.
If x = x¯, Vx = S−1w (SwV˜x − V˜wSx), since all matrices commute because they are
real, symmetric, and circulant at x¯ (Fact E.2). In fact, G[(D¯) in the Km and Helpman
models arises from Sw and represents general equilibrium effects through (F.2). In this
way, for any model whose payoff function reduces to the equations of the form (F.1)
and (F.2), V = Q(D¯)−1P(D¯) where polynomials P(t) and Q(t) are chosen such that
P(D¯) = SwV˜x − V˜wSx and Q(D¯) = Sw.
Example F.1. In Examples 2.2 and 2.3, (F.2) is given by
si(x,w) = wixi − ∑
j∈N
mijej = 0, (F.5)
where ei = e(wi, xi) with some nonnegative function e andM = [mij] is defined by
mij =
xiw1−σi φij
∑k∈N xkw1−σk φkj
. (F.6)
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In matrix form, we may write (F.5) as y−Me = 0. It gives
Sx = diag[w]−
(
diag[Me]−Mdiag[e]M>
)
diag[x]−1 −MEx, (F.7a)
Sw = diag[x] + (σ− 1)
(
diag[Me]−Mdiag[e]M>
)
diag[w]−1 −MEw. (F.7b)
Suppose Assumptions RE and S. Consider uniform distribution x¯ and let w¯ be the
uniform level of wage at x¯. Note thatM = D¯ when x = x¯. Let Ex = exw¯I and Ew = ew x¯I
at x¯. Let e¯ = e(w¯, x¯) and ζ ≡ e¯w¯x¯ . We see that
Sx = −w¯
(
(ζ − 1)I+ exD¯− ζD¯2
)
, (F.8a)
Sw = x¯
(
(1+ ζ(σ− 1)) I− ewD¯− ζ(σ− 1)D¯2
)
. (F.8b)
For instance, if e(wi, xi) = wixi, we seeWx = w¯x¯ (σI+ (σ− 1)D¯)−1D¯ at x¯. 
The matrix A = x¯a¯Va. Note that X = [∂xi(a¯)/∂ai] = Xa in (A.14) acts essentially as
Xˆ ≡ −V−1x Va for z such that z>1 = 0. Thus, Va is of interest.
For purely local regional characteristics (Example 6.1), since vi(x, a) = aivi(x), it follows
that Va = diag[v(x)]. At x¯, we have Va = v¯I. Thus, Xˆ = −v¯V−1x .
For regional characteristics that affect trade flows (Examples 6.3 and 6.4), the payoff
function and the market equilibrium condition are respectively modified to v(x, a) =
v˜(x,w, a) and s(x,w, a) = 0with some a. Then, by applying the implicit function theorem
to the modified equation, we seeVa = V˜a+ V˜wWa = V˜a− V˜wS−1w Sa. Thus, it is equivalent
to consider
Xˆ = −
(
V˜x − V˜wS−1w Sx
)−1 (
V˜a − V˜wS−1w Sa
)
(F.9)
=
(
SwV˜x − V˜wSx
)−1 (V˜wSa − SwV˜a) , (F.10)
where we also note that all matrices commute under Assumption RE.
Example F.2. In Example 6.3, we have
si(x,w, a) = wixi − ∑
j∈N
xiaiw1−σi φij
∑k∈N xkakw1−σk φkj
ej = 0, (F.11)
which induces Sa = −
(
diag[My]−Mdiag[y]M>)diag[a]−1 or, at the uniformity x = x¯,
Sa = − e¯a¯
(
I− D¯2) = − e¯a¯ (I− D¯) (I+ D¯). Section F.2.4 will derive δ(χ) for this case. 
Example F.3. In Example 6.4, we have
si(x,w, a) = wixi − ∑
j∈N
xiw1−σi φij
∑k∈N xkw1−σk φkj
e(wj, xj, aj) = 0 (F.12)
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where emaps the tuple (wj, xj, aj) to the regional expenditure. Then, we have Sa = −MEa,
or, at x¯, Sa = −eaD¯ where ea = ∂e(x¯,w¯,a¯)∂ai . We will derive δ(χ) for this case in Section
F.2.1. 
F.2 Model-by-model analyses
For self-containedness, this section provides omitted derivations of the net gain functions
G](χ) for the examples provided in the main text.39 Table F.1 at the end of this appendix
summarizes the exact mappings from each model to the coefficients of a model-dependent
net gain function G](χ) = c0 + c1χ+ c2χ2. Throughout, v¯, w¯, e¯ and so on represent that
they are the values of vi, wi, ei evaluated at x = x¯ = x¯1, unless otherwise noted.
F.2.1 Krugman (1991b) model (Examples 2.2 and 6.4)
There are two types of workers, mobile and immobile, with the total endowments of them
being 1 and L, respectively, and x ≡ (xi)i∈N denotes the spatial distribution of mobile
worker. Each worker inelastically supplies one unit of labor.
There are two industrial sectors: agriculture (abbreviated as A) and manufacturing
(abbreviated as M). The A-sector is perfectly competitive and a unit input of immobile
labor is required to produce one unit of goods. The M-sector is modeled by Dixit–Stiglitz
monopolistic competition. M-sector goods are horizontally differentiated and produced
under increasing returns to scale using mobile labor as the input. The goods of both
sectors are transported. Transportation of A-sector goods is frictionless, while that of M-
sector goods is of an iceberg form. For each unit ofM-sector goods transported from region
i to j, only the proportion 1/τij arrives, where τij > 1 for i 6= j and τii = 1.
All workers share an identical preference for bothM- and A-sector goods. The utility of
a worker in region i is given by a two-tier form. The upper tier is Cobb–Douglas over the
consumption of A-sector goods CAi and that of M-sector manufacturing constant-elasticity-
of-substitution (CES) aggregate CMi with σ > 1
CMi ≡
(
∑
j∈N
∫ nj
0
qji(ξ)
σ−1
σ dξ
) σ
σ−1
, (F.13)
that is, ui = (CAi )
µ(CAi )
1−µ where µ ∈ (0, 1) is the constant expenditure of the latter. With
free trade in the A-sector, the wage of the immobile worker is equalized, and we normalize
it to unity by taking A-sector goods as the numéraire. Consequently, region i’s expenditure
on the M-sector goods is given by ei = µ(wixi + li) where li denotes the mass of immobile
workers in region i.
39Routin derivations are omitted. For detailed derivations, see Akamatsu et al. (2017b).
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In the M-sector, to produce q units of the differentiated product, a firm requires α+ βq
units of mobile labor. The profit maximization of firms yields the price of differentiated
goods produced in region i and exported to j as pij =
σβ
σ−1wiτij, which in turn determines
gravity trade flow from j to i. That is, when Xij denotes the price of M-sector goods
produced in region i and sold in region j, Xij = mijej where the sharemij ∈ (0, 1) is defined
by (F.6) with φij ≡ τ1−σij . The proximity matrix is thus D = [φij] = [τ1−σij ].
Given x, we determine the market wage w ≡ (wi)i∈N by the M-sector product market-
clearing condition, zero-profit condition, and mobile labor market-clearing condition.
These conditions are summarized by the trade balance wixi = ∑j∈N Xij, or (F.5) with
e(xi,wi) = µ(wixi + li). By adding up (F.5) for the Krugman model, we see ∑i∈N wixi =
µ
1−µL, which constrains the total income of mobile workers at any configuration x. The
existence and uniqueness of the solution for (F.5) follow from standard arguments (e.g.,
Facchinei and Pang, 2007). Given the solution w(x) of (F.5), we have the indirect utility of
mobile workes is given by vi = ∆
µ
σ−1
i wi, where ∆i ≡ ∑k∈N xkw1−σk dki.
To satisfy Assumption S, let li = l ≡ LN for all i ∈ N . We have
∇ log v(x¯) = µ
σ− 1M
> diag[x]−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
v¯−1V˜x
+
(
I− µM>
)
diag[w]−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
v¯−1V˜w
Wx (F.14)
=
1
x¯
µ
σ− 1D¯+
1
w¯
(I− µD¯)Wx, (F.15)
where Wx is given by (F.4) and (F.8). Plugging δ = µ(w¯x¯+l)w¯x¯ = 1 (as w¯x¯ =
µ
1−µ l) and
ex = ew = µ to (F.8),
Wx =
w¯
x¯
(
σI− µD¯− (σ− 1)D¯2
)−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
x¯S−1w
D¯ (µI− D¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
w¯−1Sx
. (F.16)
Since circulantmatrices commute (FactE.2), (F.15) and (F.16) together implyV = x¯∇ log v(x¯) =
G[(D¯)−1G](D¯), where we define
G](χ) ≡ µ
(
1
σ− 1 +
1
σ
)
χ−
(
µ2
σ− 1 +
1
σ
)
χ2, (F.17)
G[(χ) ≡ 1− µ
σ
χ− σ− 1
σ
χ2, (F.18)
as presented in Section 2.2.
Remark F.1. In Figure 10, we set µ = 0.5, σ = 10, and L = 8. 
Remark F.2 (Derivation for Example 6.4). To obtain G\ with respect to l = (li)i∈N , we need
to evaluate Vl = −V˜wS−1w Sl since A = lv¯Vl. From Example F.3, we have Sl = −µD¯. Also,
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V˜w = v¯ ∂∂w log v(x¯) =
v¯
w¯ (I− µD¯) and V˜l = 0. We obtain
G\(χ) = c
χ(1− µχ)
G[(χ)
> 0 (F.19)
where c = lw¯
µ
σ =
1−µ
σ x¯ > 0. It then follows that
δ(χ) = − x¯
a¯
G\(χ)
G(χ)
= − cx¯
a¯
χ(1− µχ)
G](χ)
. (F.20)
Straightforward algebra veryfies that δ′(χ) < 0 if G](χ) > 0. 
F.2.2 Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) (FO) model (Example 3.3)
The FOmodel is a slightly simplified version the Krugmanmodel. Themodel is sometimes
called the footloose-entrepreneur model, since a unit of mobile (mobile) labor is required as
the fixed input of a manufacturing firm, thereby xi coincides with the mass of firms. The
only difference is that the variable input of M-sector firms in the Krugman model is now
replaced by immobile labor. Specifically, to produce q units of good, an M-sector firm now
requires α units ofmobile labor and βq units of immobile labor. Thus, the total cost of a firm
in region i that produces q units of good is αwi + βq. It implies pij =
σβ
σ−1τij provided that
A-sector goods are produced in every region. The market equilibrium conditions under a
fixed x ∈ X is
wi =
µ
σ ∑j∈N
φij
∑k∈N φkjxk
(wjxj + lj). (F.21)
This equation is analytically solvable. In vector–matrix form, we have
w =
µ
σ
(
I− µ
σ
Mdiag[x]
)−1
Ml, (F.22)
where l ≡ (li) andM ≡ [mij] = [φij/∆j] with ∆i = ∑j∈N φjixj. The indirect utility v(x) is
expressed as vi = ∆
µ
σ−1
i wi. At x¯, we compute that V = G
[(D¯)−1G](D¯) with
G](χ) = µ
(
1
σ− 1 +
1
σ
)
χ−
(
µ
σ− 1
µ
σ
+ 1
)
χ2, (F.23)
G[(χ) = 1− µ
σ
χ. (F.24)
F.2.3 Pflüger (2004) (Pf) model (Example 3.3)
The Pf model is a further simplified version of the FO model (and hence the Krugman
model) inwhichwe assume a quasi-linear form for the upper tier. It results in the following
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analytical expression for w:
wi =
µ
σ ∑j∈N
φij
∑k∈N φkjxk
(xj + lj). (F.25)
Indirect utility is then given by vi = log∆
µ
σ−1
i + wi, where ∆i ≡ ∑j∈N φjixj. At the uniform
distribution, we have
V =
1
v¯
(
µ
(
1
σ− 1 +
1
σ
)
D¯− µ
σ
(1+ L)D¯2
)
(F.26)
so that wemay let G](χ) = µ
(
1
σ−1 +
1
σ
)
χ− µσ (1+ L)χ2. Observe that the Pf model reveals
the agglomeration force in the Km framework in its simplest form.
F.2.4 Helpman (1998) model (Examples 2.3 and 6.3)
Helpman (1998) removed theA-sector in the Krugmanmodel and assumed that all workers
are mobile. Instead of the A-sector, the model introduces the housing (abbreviated as H)
sector. Each region i is endowed with a fixed stock ai of housing. Workers’ preference is
Cobb–Douglas of M-sector CES aggregate CMi and H-sector goods C
H
i , ui = (C
M
i )
µ(CHi )
γ,
where µ ∈ (0, 1) is the expenditure share of the former and γ = 1− µ ∈ (0, 1) is that for
the latter. There are two variants for assumptions on how housing stocks are owned: public
landownership (abbreviated as PL) and local landownership (LL). The original formulation by
Helpman (1998) supposes housing stocks are equally owned by all workers (i.e., PL). The
income of a worker in region i is the sum of the wage and an equal dividend r > 0 of rental
revenue over the economy. On the other hand, Ottaviano et al. (2002), Murata and Thisse
(2005), and Redding and Sturm (2008) assumed that housing stocks are locally owned (i.e.,
LL). The income of a worker in region i is the sum of the wage and an equal dividend of
rental revenue in each region.
Regarding the market equilibrium conditions, the only difference from the Krugman
model is regional expenditure ei on M-sector goods in each region:
[PL] ei = µ (wi + r) xi, (F.27)
[LL] ei = wixi, (F.28)
and market wage is given as the solution for (F.5). For the LL case, w(x) is uniquely given
up to normalization. The indirect utility function is
[PL] vi =
(
xi
ai
)−γ
(wi + r)µ∆
µ
σ−1
i , (F.29)
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[LL] vi =
(
xi
ai
)−γ
wµi ∆
µ
σ−1
i , (F.30)
where ∆i ≡ ∑j∈N xjw1−σj φji and r > 0.
Let ai = 1 to satisfy Assumption S. We compute that
V = x¯
(
µ
σ− 1M
> diag[x]−1 + VˆwWx − γdiag[x]−1
)
, (F.31)
where [PL] Vˆw ≡ µ
(
diag[w+ r1]−1 −M> diag[w]−1
)
, (F.32)
[LL] Vˆw ≡ µ
(
I−M>
)
diag[w]−1, (F.33)
andM is defined by (F.6). From (F.7), V = G[(D¯)−1G](D¯) with
G](χ) ≡ −γ+ µ
(
1
σ− 1 +
1
σ
)
χ−
((
µ2
σ− 1 +
1
σ
)
− γ
)
χ2, (F.34)
G[(χ) ≡ 1− µ
σ
χ− σ− 1
σ
χ2 (F.35)
for the PL case, whereas for the LL case
G](χ) ≡ (1− χ)
(
−γ+
(
µ
(
1
σ− 1 +
1
σ
)
− γσ− 1
σ
)
χ
)
, (F.36)
G[(χ) ≡ (1− χ)
(
1+
σ− 1
σ
χ
)
. (F.37)
Remark F.3. The condition for the uniqueness of the equilibrium is γσ = (1− µ)σ > 1
(Redding and Sturm, 2008). For both PL and LL, it implies that G](χ) < 0 for all χ ∈
(0, 1). 
Remark F.4 (Derivation for Example 6.3). The regional model formulated in §3 of Redding
andRossi-Hansberg (2017) is an enhanced version of theHelpmanmodelwith LL, inwhich
the variable input of mobile labor is allowed to depend on region i (i.e., productivity differs
across regions). That is, the cost function of firms in region i is given byCi(q) = wi(α+ βiq).
The market equilibrium condition for this case is, with ai ≡ β1−σi > 0, given by
si(x,w) = wixi − ∑
j∈N
xiaiw1−σi φij
∑k∈N xkakw1−σk φkj
wjxj = 0. (F.38)
The payoff function is given by (F.33) with ∆i = ∑k∈N xkakw1−σk φki.
From Example F.2, Sa = − w¯x¯a¯ (I− D¯) (I+ D¯) as e¯ = w¯x¯. Also, we have V˜w = v¯w¯µ(I−
D¯), V˜a = v¯a¯
µ
σ−1D¯, and Sw = σx¯G
[(D¯). Since Va = V˜a − V˜wS−1w Sa and A = a¯v¯Va = G\(D¯),
A22
we compute
G\(χ) = c
(σ− 1) + σχ
G[(χ)
> 0 (F.39)
where c ≡ v¯a¯ µσ > 0. This in turn implies
δ(χ) = − x¯
a¯
G\(χ)
G(χ)
= − cx¯
a¯
(σ− 1) + σχ
G](χ)
(F.40)
where G](χ) is that for the LL case (F.37). We can show that δ′(χ) > 0 for all χ whenever
(1− µ)σ > 1 so that equilibrium is unique (Remark F.3). 
F.2.5 Puga (1999) model (Example 3.3)
Puga (1999) generalized the Krugman model in two directions, namely (i) the inter-sector
mobility of workers between the A- and M-sector (without immobile workers but land)
and (ii) intermediate inputs in the M-sector, both as in Krugman and Venables (1995).
There is only a unit mass of mobile workers. Let xMi and x
A
i the masses of workers
engaged in theM-andA-sectors, respectively (xi = xMi + x
A
i ). Thehomogeneouspreference
of consumers is the same as in the Krugman model, with the expenditure share of the M-
sector good µ and elasticity of substitution between M-sector varieties σ. Each region is
endowedwith ai units of land owned by immobile landlords that have the same preference
as theworkers. We assume that if a worker relocates, then he or she first enters theM-sector
of the destination region. The stability of the spatial pattern x is then reduced to the study
of xM ≡ [xMi ].
The A-sector is perfectly competitive and produces a homogeneous output by using
labor and land under constant returns to scale. A-sector goods are costless to trade and
set as the numéraire. Let XAi be the gross regional product of the A-sector. In line with
the original study, we specify a Cobb–Douglas production function with labor share µ¯;
in concrete terms, we have XAi = (x
A
i )
µ¯a1−µ¯i . This implies that the total labor costs of
A-sector firms are given by µ¯XAi = wix
A
i , while their land costs (= the total rental revenue
of landlords) are (1− µ¯)XAi = 1−µ¯µ¯ wixAi . In particular, labor demand in this sector is given
by a function of thewage xAi = ai(wi/µ¯)
1/(µ¯−1), becausewi = µ¯(xAi /ai)
µ¯−1. Let xAi = eix
M
i ,
meaning that xi = (1+ ei)xMi ; we assume x
M
i 6= 0, because we are interested in the stability
of complete dispersion. We also have ei ≡ (ai/xMi )(wi/µ¯)1/(µ¯−1). The regional rental
revenue from land, Ri, in terms of xMi is
Ri ≡ 1− µ¯µ¯ eiwix
M
i . (F.41)
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By employing the above formulae, the elasticity νi of a region’s labor supply to theM-sector
with respect to wage is νi ≡ wixMi
∂xMi
∂wi
=
xAi
xMi
1
1−µ¯ = ei
1
1−µ¯ .
By considering the simplest possible model of round-about intermediate inputs as in
Krugman and Venables (1995), the minimized cost in the M-sector is Ci(q) = P
µˆ
i w
1−µˆ
i (α+
βq)where Pi is the price index ofM-sector goods in region i and µˆ the share of intermediates
in firms’ costs. The (variety-independent) profit-maximizing price is given by
pij =
σβ
σ− 1P
µˆ
i w
1−µˆ
i τij. (F.42)
Resultingly, P = (Pi)i∈N should satisfy the following equation:
ti(x,w,P) = P1−σi −
1
1− µˆ ∑j∈N
xMj P
−µˆσ
j w
1−σ+µˆσ
j φji. (F.43)
Land is locally owned by immobile landlords that share the same preference as mobile
workers; their regional expenditure on M-sector goods is given by µRi. In addition,
the regional expenditure of firms on intermediates is given by µˆCini =
µˆ
1−µˆwix
M
i . Total
expenditure in region i on M-sector goods is ei = µwixi + µRi + µˆCini. By using (F.41) as
well as xi = (1+ ei)xMi , this is simplified to
ei =
(
µ
(
1+
ei
µ¯
)
+
µˆ
1− µˆ
)
wixMi . (F.44)
The market equilibrium condition for the model is given by
si(x,w,P) =
1
1− µˆwix
M
i − ∑
j∈N
mijej = 0 (F.45)
where we define
mij =
xMi P
−µˆσ
i w
1−σ+µˆσ
i φij
∑k∈N xMk P
−µˆσ
k w
1−σ+µˆσ
k φkj
. (F.46)
The market wage w = (wi) and price index P = (Pi) are obtained as the solution for the
system of non-linear equations (F.43) and (F.45). We require µˆ < σ−1σ , meaning that P and
w are uniquely determined for any transportation cost. Given P and w, the indirect utility
function is vi = v˜i(x,w,P) = ∆
µ
σ−1
i wi with ∆i = ∑j∈N x
M
j P
−µˆσ
j w
1−σ+µˆσ
j φji.
Let ai = a for all i to satisfy Assumption S. Note that v(x) is differentiated in xM
as Vx = V˜x + V˜wWx + V˜PPx, where Wx = [∂wi/∂xMj ] and Px = [∂Pi/∂x
M
j ] are eval-
uated by applying the implicit function theorem to (F.43) and (F.45). We must have
Txdx + TwWxdw + TPPxdP = 0 and Sxdx + SwWxdw + SPPxdP = 0 for any infinites-
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imal (dx, dw, dP), thereby
Px = − (TwSP − TPSw)−1 (TwSx − TxSw) , (F.47)
Wx = (TwSP − TPSw)−1 (TPSx − TxSP) . (F.48)
A patient computation yields V = x¯Mv¯ Vx = G
[(D¯)−1G](D¯) with
G](D¯) ≡
(
µˇ
(
1
σ− 1 +
1
σ
)
D¯−
(
µˇ2
σ− 1 +
1
σ
+ η
)
D¯2
)
(F.49)
and G[(D¯) is a positive definite matrix defined by D¯. We let µˇ ≡ µˆ+ µ(1− µˆ), which is
loosely interpreted as the aggregate expenditure in the economy on M-sector goods, and
η ≡ µ(1−µˇ)
σ(σ−1) (1− ν¯) is a constant that summarizes the effects of labor mobility between the
A- andM-sectors at x¯, where ν¯ ≡ µ¯1−µ¯ 1−µµ is the elasticity of labor supply from the A-sector
to the M-sector with respect to wage at x¯.
F.2.6 Tabuchi (1998) model
The Tabuchimodel introduces the internal structure of regions to the Krugmanmodel. The
main thrust of this model is that unlike the majority of regional models, the city boundary
in each region is endogenously determined by the full-fledged monocentric city model of
Alonso–Muth–Mills. This produces a rich structure of urban costs, because the trade-off
between commuting costs and land rents is explicit.
There are three sectors, M, H, and A. The internal structure of each region is featureless,
except that it is endowedwith a single central business district (CBD)with negligible spatial
extent. In each region, locations are indexed by the distance from the CBD, ` ≥ 0. At any
point, the land endowment density is assumed to be unity. The total mass of mobile and
immobile workers are given by 1 and L, respectively. The mass of mobile workers in region
i is denoted by xi, whereas the spatial distribution (density) in that region is, allowing
notational abuse, denoted by xi(`). Thus, we have∫ `i
0
xi(`)d` = xi, (F.50)
where `i ≥ 0 is the city boundary in region i that is endogenously determined. Immobile
workers are employed by the A-sector and do not commute to the CBD, whereas mobile
workers do. A mobile worker at distance ` from the CBD incurs the generalized cost of
commuting T(`), which is measured by the numéraire. For simplify, we assume that the
internal structure of each region is one-dimensional and extends symmetrically around the
CBD such that [−`i, `i] á la Murata and Thisse (2005).
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The utility of a representative worker living in region i and located at ` is given by
ui = (CMi )
µ(CHi )
γ(CAi )
1−µ−γ where µ and γ with µ+ γ < 1 are the constant expenditure
shares for M-sector goods and H-sector goods, respectively; CMi is the CES aggregate of M-
sector goods, CHi the consumption of housing space (H-sector goods), C
A
i the consumption
of agricultural products (A-sector goods) in region i. The M- and A-sectors are the same
as in the Krugman model, whereas the H-sector is the same as in the Helpman model.
By choosing A-sector goods as the numéraire, the budget constraint of a mobile worker at
location ` in region i is
CAi + ri(`)C
H
i (`) + ∑
j∈N
∫ nj
0
pji(ξ)qji(ξ)dξ = yi(`) = yi − T(`), (F.51)
where ri(`) is the land rent prevailing at location ` in region i, T(`) the generalized cost of
commuting from location ` to the CBD, and yi the income of the worker. We assume that
T(`) is differentiable and increasing in ` with T(0) = 0.
Following the tradition of urban economics, the model assumes absentee landowners
who keep the rental revenue of housing, leading to yi = wi for every mobile worker.
Immobile workers live outside the city and do not commute to the CBD. Thus, they face
the region-independent agricultural land rent rA > 0 and zero commuting cost and yi = 1.
Intracity transportation of M-sector goods is costless, so that workers in each region face
the same M-sector product price.
As shown in the original paper, the population density in the region for the given `i
and wi is given by
xi(`,wi) =
rA
γwi
(
1− T(`i)
wi
)− 1γ (
1− T(`)
wi
) 1
γ−1
(F.52)
We define the total commuting costs in the region by
Ti(`i,wi) =
∫ `i
0
T(`)xi(`,wi)d`. (F.53)
Note that (xi,wi) is uniquely mapped to `i due to (F.50) and (F.52), so that Ti is also a
function of (xi,wi).
The market equilibrium condition is given by (F.5), where we let
ei = µ
(∫ `i
−`i
yi(`)xi(`)d`+ li
)
= µ (wixi − Ti + li) . (F.54)
Then, the indirect utility in region i may be given evaluating it at the city boundary
` = `i, since utility is equalized in each region: vi(x) = v˜i(x,w) = ∆
µ
σ−1
i yi(`i), where
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∆i = ∑j∈N xjw1−σj φji and yi(`i) = wi − T(`i).
Let li = l for all i ∈ N to impose Assumption S and consider x¯. Let w¯ and T¯ be
the uniform level of the nominal wage rate and total commuting cost in each region,
respectively. Note that T¯ is a function of w¯ and x¯. For normalization, we require
w¯x¯− T¯(`, w¯) = µ
1− µ l. (F.55)
Then, there must exist a unique positive solution for the location of city boundary and
wage rate ( ¯` , w¯) for the system of non-linear equations defined by (F.50) and (F.55). By
employing the solution ( ¯` , w¯), total expenditure in a region is given by Y¯ = l1−µ . Define
the ratios κ of the regional disposable income of mobile workers and κˆ of regional total
expenditure to the total nominal wage: κ ≡ w¯x¯−T¯w¯x¯ and κˆ ≡ Y¯w¯x¯ . The latter implies that
Y¯
w¯ = κˆx¯ and
Y¯
x¯ = κˆw¯. Given ( ¯` , w¯), we define positive constants ψ0, ψ1, ρ0, and ρ1 such that
Tx = ψ0I, Ty = ψ1I, Ex = ρ0w¯I, and Ey = ρ1x¯I.
Following Tabuchi (1998), we consider the simplest case where the commuting cost
function is linear with respect to distance: T(`) = t`. Then,
¯` =
1
t
(1− eγ)w¯, (F.56)
where e ∈ (0, 1) is defined by e ≡ (1 + tˆx¯)−1. The parameter tˆ ≡ t2rA is interpreted as
a measure of the relative magnitude of commuting costs to land rents. As expected, ¯` is
decreasing in the generalized commuting cost per distance t. By solving (F.55), we have
w¯ =
1
κ
µ
1− µL and κ =
1
1+ γ
1− e1+γ
1− e (F.57)
as well as y¯ ≡ w¯ − T( ¯`) = eγw¯, Y¯ = l1−µ , and κˆ = κµ . Then, we have ψ0 = y¯γx¯ (1− e),
ψ1 = 1− eγ, ρ0 = 1− γ(1− e)κ, and ρ1 = κ. Summarizing computations up to here gives:
Vx =
1
x¯
(
µ
σ− 1D¯+
x¯
w¯
(I− µD¯)Wx − γˆI
)
, (F.58)
Wx =
w¯
x¯
(
cˆ0I+ cˆ1D¯+ cˆ2D¯2
)−1 (
c¯0I+ c¯1D¯+ c¯2D¯2
)
(F.59)
with the coefficients being
cˆ0 ≡ 1+ (σ− 1)κ > 0,
cˆ1 ≡ −µκ < 0,
cˆ2 ≡ −(σ− 1)κ < 0,

c¯0 ≡ −(1− κ) < 0,
c¯1 ≡ µ(1− γˆκ) > 0,
c¯2 ≡ −κ < 0
(F.60)
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where γˆ ≡ γ(1− e). Note that κ and γˆ together summarize the net effects of the two types of
urban costs; κ and γˆ represent those from commuting and non-tradable land, respectively.
Algebra shows that a net gain function for the model is G](χ) = c0 + c1χ+ c2χ2 with
c0 = −γˆ
(
1
σ
+
σ− 1
σ
κ
)
< 0, (F.61)
c1 = µ
(
1
σ− 1 +
1
σ
)
> 0, (F.62)
c2 = −
(
µ2
σ− 1θ +
1
σ
θˆ
)
(F.63)
where we let θ ≡ κσ + σ−1σ (1− γˆκ) and θˆ ≡ κ (1− γˆκ(σ− 1)). For non-extremal cases,
c2 < 0 and the Tabuchi model incorporates both local and global dispersion forces.
F.2.7 Pflüger and Südekum (2008) model (Example 3.5)
The Pflüger–Südekum model builds on Pflüger (2004), with the only difference being that
it introduces the housing sector (again denoted by H), which produces a local dispersion
force. The indirect utility of a mobile worker in region i is
vi(x) =
µ
σ− 1 ln[∆i]− γ ln
xi + li
ai
+ wi, (F.64)
where ∆i = ∑j∈N φjixj, and li and ai denote the mass of immobile workers and amount of
housing stock in region i, respectively. The nominal wage in region i is given by (F.25). Let
li = l and ai = a for all i to meet Assumption S. Then, we see that V = 1v¯G
](D¯) with
G](χ) = − γ
1+ L
+ µ
(
1
σ− 1 +
1
σ
)
χ− µ
σ
(1+ L)χ2. (F.65)
Remark F.5. Figure 13a and Figure 13b assume the Pflüger–Südekum model. We set
µ = 0.4, σ = 2.5, L = 4, γ = 0.5, and a = 1. 
F.2.8 Murata and Thisse (2005) model (Example 3.4)
Similar to the Tabuchi model, Murata and Thisse (2005) studied the interplay between
commuting costs and interregional transport costs by employing a simplifiedyet reasonable
specification. The internal structure of each region is assumed to be one-dimensional and
featureless except that there is a given CBD; the city expands symmetrically around the
origin. There are onlymobile andmobile workers, who choose their own residential region
i and location ` ≥ 0 in that region, where the CBD is located at ` = 0.
Land endowment equals unity everywhere in a region and workers are assumed to
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inelastically consume one unit of land. The opportunity cost of land is normalized to zero
in every region. Then, the city spreads in the interval Xi ≡ [−`i, `i], where `i ≡ xi2 denotes
the city boundary. Commuting costs take an iceberg form. Specifically, a worker located
at ` supplies s(`) = 1− 4θ|`| units of labor, where we require θ ∈ [0, 12) so that we have
s(`) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X and for all region i at any configuration. Then, total effective labor
supply in the CBD of region i is given by
Si =
∫
Xi
s(`)d` = xi(1− θxi). (F.66)
Note that Si = xi when commuting is costless so that θ = 0. Land is locally owned as in
the Helpman model with LL (Section F.2.4).
The homogeneous preference of mobile workers in region i is ui = lnCMi where C
M
i
is the consumption of the CES aggregate of M-sector goods. Manufacturing firms are
assumed to be the same as in the Krugman model. Specifically, to produce q units of a
good, a firm requires α+ βq units of mobile labor. The market equilibrium condition is
wiSi = ∑
j∈N
Siw1−σi φij
∑k∈N Skw1−σk φkj
wjSj (F.67)
To normalize w, we assume ∑i∈N wiSi = 1 > 0. Given the solution w to the equation, the
indirect utility of workers in region i is obtained as
vi(x) =
1
σ− 1 ln[∆i] + ln[wi] + ln[1− θxi], (F.68)
where ∆i ≡ ∑k∈N Skw1−σk dki.
We compute as follows:
Vx =
1
σ− 1M
> diag[S]−1Sx + (I−M>)diag[w]−1Wx − θ diag[1− θx]−1, (F.69)
where Sx = diag[1− 2θx]. At x¯, we have
Wx =
w¯(1− 2θx¯)
x¯(1− θx¯) (σI+ (σ− 1)D¯)
−1 D¯, (F.70)
implying that V = x¯v¯Vx =
1−2θx¯
(1−θx¯)v¯G
[(D¯)−1G](D¯) with
G](χ) = −θˆ +
(
(1− θˆ)
(
1
σ− 1 +
1
σ
)
− θˆ σ− 1
σ
)
χ, (F.71)
G[(χ) = 1+
σ− 1
σ
χ, (F.72)
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where we define θˆ ≡ θx¯1−2θx¯ .
F.2.9 Harris and Wilson (1978) (Example 3.3)
The Harris–Wilson model is an archetypal economic geography model formulated in the
field of geography well before economists started to emphasize the self-organization of the
spatial allocation of economic activity. A detailed analysis of the model can be found in
Osawa et al. (2017).
The city is discretized into N zones and associated centroids. There is a continuum of
retailing firms in each zone that operate a shop. The mass of firms in zone i is denoted
by xi ≥ 0; x denotes the spatial distribution of retailers. A fixed proportion of consumers
resides in each zone. Consumers are assumed to inelastically buy retail goods from some
shop located in the city. Total per capita consumer demand for a shopping activity in zone
i is a constantOi. Consumers’ shopping behavior is captured by a set of origin-constrained
gravity equations. For any given x, consumer demand Sij(x) from zone i to j is given by
Sij =
xαj φij
∑k∈N xαkφik
Oi, (F.73)
with α > 0. The term xαi is the “attractiveness” of the retailers in zone i.
The payoff (profit) of a retailer in zone i is defined as follows:
Πi(x) =
∑j∈N Sji
xi
− κi, (F.74)
where κi is the fixed cost of entry.
Harris andWilson (1978) assumed that the spatial pattern x gradually evolves in propor-
tion to the profit Π(x) and the state x. Specifically, we let x˙i = Fi(x) ≡ xiΠi(x) = Si − κixi
where Si = ∑j∈N Sji.
To satisfy Assumption S, let Oi = 1 and κi = κ for all i ∈ N . The Harris–Wilson model
is an open-citymodel. The total mass of retailers at an equilibrium is thus determined from
the following equilibrium condition: xiΠi(x) = 0, xi ≥ 0, Πi(x) ≤ 0. At any equilibrium,
we have ∑i∈N κixi = ∑i∈N Oi and thus ifOi = 1 and κi = κ then X ≡ {x ∈ RK | ∑i∈N xi =
N
κ , xi ≥ 0} is globally attracting under F. It is immediately clear that
∇F(x¯) = (κα)
(
α− 1
α
I− D¯2
)
, (F.75)
so that G](χ) = α−1α − χ2 for the model.
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F.2.10 Takayama and Akamatsu (2011) (Example 3.5)
Takayama and Akamatsu (2011) is a partial equilibrium model that introduces a spatial
competition effect à la Harris and Wilson (1978) into the Beckmann model. Specifically,
in essence, they introduced firms that sell goods at a fixed price to spatially immobile
consumers.
In each area, li immobile consumers with ∑i li = L demand a single unit of goods
produced by firms; immobile consumers are assumed to engage in jobs in other industries.
Given the spatial distribution n = (ni)i∈N of firms, demand from area j to i is given by the
following origin-constrained gravity equation:
qji =
φˆji
∑k∈N φˆjknk
lj (F.76)
with φˆij ∈ (0, 1). A manufacturing firm produces a single unit of a manufactured good
at a fixed price µ, using a single unit of the labor of mobile workers. Thus, we must have
ni = xi. The profit function of the firm at i is given by
Πi(x) = µ ∑
j∈N
φˆji
∑k∈N φˆjkxk
lj − wi. (F.77)
Firms can freely enter and exit the city, thereby drawing zero profit. We abstract from
commuting between different areas. Then, the wage of a mobile worker in area i equals
wi(x) = µ ∑
j∈N
φˆji
∑k∈N φˆjkxk
lj. (F.78)
The indirect utility of the worker is set to be
vi(x) = wi(x) + log[∆i]− γ log[xi]. (F.79)
where ∆i ≡ ∑j∈N φijxj denotes social utility as in the Beckmann model (Example 2.1).
Let li = 1 for all i. Also, assume that φij = φˆij for all i and j. Then, we see that
V = 1v¯G
](D¯) with G](χ) = −γ+ χ− µχ2.
F.2.11 Allen and Arkolakis (2014) (AA) (Example 3.4)
The AAmodel is a perfectly competitive Armington (1969)-based framework with positive
and negative local externalities. We introduce a discrete-space version of the AA model
to fit our context. We also abstract away all exogenous differences across regions. In the
model, productivity of a location is proportional to xαi with α > 0, representing positive
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externalities. The market equilibrium condition is
si(x,w) = wixi − ∑
j∈N
w1−σi x
α(σ−1)
i φij
∑k∈N w1−σk x
α(σ−1)
k φkj
wjxj = 0. (F.80)
With market wage w, the payoff function is given by vi(x) = x
β
i wi∆
1
σ−1
i where ∆i ≡
∑k∈N w1−σk x
α(σ−1)
k φki. The term x
β
i with β < 0 represents negative externalities from
congestion, as in the Beckmann model (Example 2.1). Direct computation gives V =
G[(D¯)−1G](D¯) with
G](χ) = −(α+ β− γ0) + (α+ β+ γ1)χ, (F.81)
G[(χ) = (σ+ (σ− 1)χ) (1− χ) , (F.82)
where γ0 ≡ 1+ασ and γ1 ≡ 1−βσ .
Remark F.6. In Figure 11, the parameters are set to α = 0.5, β = −0.3, and σ = 6. For
Figure 14a, we let β = −0.6 so that α+ β < 0. 
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